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REACCEPTING THE COMPULSORY JURISDICTION
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A
PROPOSAL FOR A NEW UNITED STATES
DECLARATION
On October 7, 1985, the United States gave notice that it had opted to
end its forty-year acceptance of the "compulsory jurisdiction" of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ or the Court).l In explaining the Presi-
dent's decision to terminate the United States Declaration of Recognition of
Compulsory Jurisdiction, 2 the State Department cited, among other things,
the lack of protection afforded by extant reservations to the Court's juris-
diction, and the inability of the United States to use its own acceptance to
bring other states before the Court. Perhaps the primary reason, similar to
that advanced following the United States withdrawal from the litigation
brought by Nicaragua against the United States, 3 is the administration's
belief that the composition of the Court is essentially hostile to United
States interests.4
This Comment analyzes the administration's cessation of its obligations
under the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction and concludes that the decision
was unwarranted in failing to recognize valid alternatives which answer
objections to the Court's alleged politicization. An examination of the role
of compulsory jurisdiction in ICJ adjudication, United States practice
under compulsory jursidiction, and the bases for the administration's
decision provide an analytic foundation for the evaluation of alternatives to
outright termination. Those alternatives are analyzed in light of the admin-
istration's specific grievances. The Comment recommends reconsideration
of the decision and adoption of procedural innovations in the form of
1. See Letter from Secretary of State Schultz to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Oct.
7, 1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985).
2. United States Declaration of Aug. 14, 1946, 61 Star. 1218, T.I.A.S. No. 1598, 1 U.N.T.S. 9
[hereinafter 1946 Declaration]. Pursuant to the terms of the 1946 Declaration, the termination became
effective 6 months after deposit of the notice.
3. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392
(Judgment of Nov. 26 on Jurisdiction and Admissibility). See also Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and Against Nicaragua 1984 I.C.J. 169 (Order of May 10). Unless otherwise indicated, all references
to the Paramilitary Activities case will be to the Judgment of Nov. 26.
4. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. Withdrawalfrom the Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua in the
ICJ (Statement of Jan. 18, 1985), 85 DEP'T ST. BULL. No. 2096, at 64 (Mar. 1985) [hereinafter
Statement on Withdrawal]; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. Terminates Acceptance of the ICJ Compulsory
Jurisdiction (Statement of Oct. 9, 1985), 86 DEP'T ST. BuLL. No. 2106, at 67 (Jan. 1986), reprinted in
24 I.L.M. 249 (1985) [hereinafter Statement on Termination]; The United States and the World Court,
Current Policy No. 78, Statement of Dec. 4, 1985 Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
(statement of Dep't Legal Adviser A. Sofaer), reprinted in 86 DeP'T ST. BULL. No. 2106, at 67
[hereinafter Sofaer Statement]; Robinson, Letter to the Editor in Chief 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 423 (1979);
N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1985, at A3, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
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proposed "reservations" to a future United States declaration of acceptance
of the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction. 5
I. THE ICJ
A. Background
The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. 6 It func-
tions pursuant to the Statute of the Court,7 which is annexed to, but not
incorporated into, the Charter of the United Nations. Although the Court's
Statute is considered an integral part 8 of the Charter, the Court remains
independent in the exercise of its substantive functions. 9
The ICJ is the successor to the Permanent Court of International Justice,
established in 1920 under the auspices of the League of Nations. The
Statute and procedures of the present Court are substantially the same as
those of the earlier body. 10 However, the organic connection between the
ICJ and the members of the United Nations is more pronounced than that
5. Discussion is predicated on the assumption that the idea of compulsory jurisdiction (and, for that
matter, the existence of the Court itself) is a good thing-an issue that will be noted only briefly. For
more definitive analyses, see generally Review of the International Court of Justice, Report of the
Secretary-General, 26 U.N. GAOR (Agenda Item 97) at 7-15, U.N. Doc. A/8382 (1971) [hereinafter
Report of the Secretary-General]; C.W. JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
(1964); D'Amato, Modifying U.S. Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the World Court, 79
AM. J. INT'L L. 385, 400-05 (1985); Gross, Conclusions, in I THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE 729-33 (L. Gross ed. 1976) [hereinafter FUTURE OF THE ICJ]; Rogers, The Rule of
Law and the Settlement ofInternational Disputes, 1970 PROc. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 285, 286; Warren,
Toward a More Active International Court, I I VA. J. INTL L. 295 (197 1). But cf G. Scott & C. Carr, The
ICJ and Compulsory Jurisdiction: The Case for Closing the Clause (unpublished manuscript presented
to the 1986 Convention of the International Studies Association, Anaheim, California) (the Optional
Clause ought to be abolished); Goldwater, Foreward to D. KITCHEL, Too GRAVE A RISK: THE CONNALLY
AMENDMENT ISSUE 7 (1963) (the World Court holds a sinister threat for United States sovereignty).
6. U.N. CHARTER arts. 7, 92.
7. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE.
8. U.N. CHARTER art. 92.
9. For instance, the ICJ can and does have a wider membership than the United Nations itself. See
States Entitled to Appear Before the Court, 1984-1985 1.C.J.Y.B. 47,47-54(1985). Liechtenstein, San
Marino, and Switzerland are states not members of the United Nations that are at present parties to the
ICJ Statute. Id. at 52.
Similarly, while the Statute can be amended in the same way as the Charter, the ICJ has drawn up its
own Rules of Court pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by article 30, paragraph I of the Statute.
See infra note 18.
For a general discussion of the relationship between. the Court and the U.N., see Note, The
International Court of Justice: A Key to World Peace, 14 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 480, 483-97 (1946).
10. The ICJ does not correlate perfectly with the Permanent Court. Certain technical adjustments
account for the disappearance of the League, to which the former Court was an adjunct, and for the
organization of the United Nations. See INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE 14-20 (1976); Note, Separation of Powers Within the United Nations: A Revised Rolefor the
International Court of Justice, 38 STAN. L. REV. 165, 166 & n.9. (1985).
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which existed between the Permanent Court and the members of the
League. I"
The Charter of the United Nations provides that "All Members of the
United Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute." 12 This has the
important effect of organizing the international political community into an
international judicial framework. The provision perforce confers recogni-
tion of the authority of the Court in its capacity as one of the principal
organs of the United Nations. 13 In theory, this enhances the linkage
between international political problems and legal problems. 14 In other
words, implicit in United Nations membership is the recognition that
international legal disputes can be resolved by binding adjudication. 15
B. Jurisdiction
The ICJ's jurisdiction 16 is, by statute, premised on the consent of the
parties, 17 and only states may be parties in cases before the Court. 18 These
11. See Note, supra note 9, at 482-83.
12. U.N. CHARTER art. 93, para. 1. Article 93, para. 2 of the Charter provides that states which are
not members of the United Nations may become parties to the Statute on conditions determined by the
General Assembly on recommendation of the Security Council. See States Entitled to Appear Before
the Court, 1984-1985 I.C.J.Y.B. 47, 51-52 (1985).
13. This does not mean, however, that membership in the United Nations requires acceptance of the
Court's compulsory jurisdiction.
14. In practice, however, states regard international disputes as fundamentally political in nature.
See Rovine, The National Interest and the World Court, in 1 FUtrURE OF THE ICJ, supra note 5, at 313,
318-19. For a discussion of the importance of the law/politics dichotomy in connection with the
jurisdiction of the ICJ, see G. Scott & C. Carr, supra note 5, at 21-27.
15. The question ofthe binding force of an ICJjudgment is distinct from that of enforceability, with
which this Comment is not primarily concerned. On the international plane, the problem of jurisdiction
is generally more important than the problem of securing compliance with decisions. As jurisdiction is
based on consent, such consent implies consent to abide by the Court's decisions, which should be
complied with in good faith. Article 94, paragraph 1, of the Charter provides: "Each Member of the
United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case
to which it is a party." Thus, enforcement ofjudgments is left primarily to the parties as a matter of legal
obligation, with residual enforcement authority in the Security Council under article 94, paragraph 2,
which has never been invoked. Problems involving efforts to bring about compliance have been
extremely rare. Kerley, Ensuring Compliance with Judgments of the International Court of Justice, in 1
FUTUtRE OF THE ICJ, supra note 5, at 276. Nonetheless, it has been suggested that the degree of actual
compliance is a measure of the power and importance of the court, particularly in cases involving
compulsory jurisdiction. See, e.g., S. ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
116 (2d rev. ed. 1985); Schachter, The Enforcement ofInternational andArbitral Decisions, 54 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1, 5 (1960).
16. The term "jurisdiction" will be used to refer to the capacity of the ICJ to decide concrete cases
with binding force.
17. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JusTIcE, art. 36, para. 1 ("The jurisdiction of the
Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the
Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.").
18. Id. art. 34, pam. 1. In this respect, the Court's jurisdictional limitation incorporates a
1147
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express limitations on the Court's jurisdiction-the principles of jurisdic-
tion ratione materiae and ratione personae, 19 respectively-confer on
states merely the ability to seek judicial settlement of international disputes
before the ICJ. 20 Thus, a decision to have recourse to the Court is neces-
sarily "a deliberate political decision. ",21 As such, the Court's jurisdiction
depends more on recognition of international legal accountability than on
the exercise of judicial power. 22
The mutual consent of both parties to the dispute, either for a particular
case or generally for future cases, is required for the Court to be seised of a
dispute. It is this agreement ratione materiae, that determines the jurisdic-
tion of the Court so far as the particular dispute is concerned. 23 The concept
traditional tenet of international law: "[I]nternational Law is primarily concerned with the rights and
duties of States. . . ; States only possess full procedural capacity before international tribunals. " I L.
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (7th ed. 1948). But see Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the
Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 179 (Advisory Opinion) (international organizations can
and do possess international personality, so as to be capable of advancing international claims, although
they do not possess full procedural capacity).
Statehood itself is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition to confer full procedural capacity
before the ICJ. Membership in the United Nations, or accedence to the Statute without membership,
affords an applicant or intervening party access to the Court. See supra notes 9 & 12. "[I1f the
respondent State is not likewise aualified the Court will not be in a position to exercise jurisdiction
against it." S. ROSENNE, supra note 15, at 267. The Court is also open to states that are not parties to the
Statute upon conditions laid down by the Security Council. See States Entitled to Appear Before the
Court, 1984-1985 I.C.J.Y.B. 47, 52-54 (1985).
Apart from its jurisdiction to deal with contentious cases, the ICJ also has the power to give advisory
opinions on "any legal question" at the request of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the
Security Council, Specialized Agencies, or other duly authorized bodies. U.N. CHARTER art. 92;
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, arts. 65-68; Rules of Court, arts. 87-91, 1978 I.C.J.
Acts & Does. No. 4, at 93, reprinted in 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 748 (1979), also reprinted in S. ROSENNE,
DOCUMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 205-73 (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter Rules of
Court].
19. The two jurisdictional principles are the rough equivalents of the familiar concepts of personal
and subject-matter jurisdiction in domestic law.
20. A third principle, "jurisdiction ratione temporis,'" does not exist as an express independent
jurisdictional requirement either in the Statute or opinions of the Permanent or present Court. The
implications of time on the scope of ICJ jurisdiction are generally limited to "reservations ratione
temporis," which restrict the period in which states can assert otherwise valid jurisdiction against the
declarant. See infra text accompanying notes 78-82. "This means that an objection ratione temporis to
the jurisdiction of the Court can never be more than a secondary objection to jurisdiction." S. ROSENNE,
supra note 15, at 329-31.
21. S. ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND How ITWORKs 65 (3d rev. ed. 1973). See also
Fischer, Decisions to Use the International Court of Justice, 26 INT'L STUD. Q. 251 (1982) (discussing
the bases for national decisions regarding ICJ litigation).
22. Cf Justice Holmes' assertion in McDonald v. Maiee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) ("The foundation
of jurisdiction is physical power .... ").
23. Article 36, paragraph I of the Statute enunciates this general principle. See supra, note 17. Cf
U.N. CHARTER art. 36 (The Security Council, which may at any stage of a dispute recommend
appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment, shall "take into consideration that legal disputes
should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice."); Corfu Channel
(U.K. v. Alb.), 1948 I.C.J. 15, 26 (Preliminary Objection) (finding a recommendation by the Security
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of consent in ICJ adjudication is multifaceted, because consent to ICJ
jurisdiction may be conferred in a number of ways.
Article 36, paragaph 1 of the Statute contemplates two basic procedures
by which a state may indicate its consent. The first procedure is where the
parties bilaterally agree to submit an already existing dispute to the ICJ and
thus to recognize its jurisdiction over that particular case. 24 The second
procedure is where treaties or conventions in force confer jurisdiction on
the Court.25
Another means of consenting to the Court's jurisdiction, known as the
"Optional Clause,"' 26 is described in paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the
Council to this effect insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Court independently of the wishes of the
parties to the dispute).
24. Such a special agreement is generally referred to as a compromis. S. RoSENNE, supra note 21, at
68. Once a compromis has been duly submitted, the Court can entertain the case. See, e.g., Minquiers
and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47, 49 (Judgment of Nov. 17); Sovereignty Over Certain Frontier
Land (Belg. v. Neth.), 1959 I.C.J. 209,210-11 (Judgment of June 20); North Sea Continental Shelf (W.
Ger. v. Den., W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 5-7 (Judgment of Feb. 20).
25. It has become a general international practice to include, in both bilateral and multilateral
international agreements, provisions stipulating that certain disputes shall, either immediately or after
the failure of other means of peaceful settlement, be referred to the ICJ. Such provisions are called
compromissory clauses, and their wording generally varies from one treaty to another. See, e.g.,
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, art. IX, 78
U.N.T.S. 277; Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation, Feb. 21, 1961, United States-
Belgium, art. 19(2), 14 U.S.T. 1284, T.I.A.S. No. 5432. See generally Chronological List of Other
Instruments Governing the Jurisdiction of the Court, 1984-1985 I.C.J.Y.B. 102, 102-118 (1985). The
States signatory to such agreements may, ifa dispute of the kind envisaged in the compromissory clause
of the treaty arises between them, either file an application instituting proceedings against the other
party or parties in the ICJ, or conclude a special agreement with such a party or parties providing for the
issue to be referred to the ICJ.
A third procedure, known as "forum prorogatum," occurs when a dispute is brought before the Court
where at the time of the institution of the proceedings only one of the disputants has validly recognized
its jurisdiction over the case in question and the other has not. The latter state may subsequently
recognize the Court's jurisdiction, and the Court thereby obtains jurisdiction. This situation is quite rare
in practice. See T. ELAS, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND SOME CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
41-42 (citing Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 11;
Rights of Minorities in UpperSilesia (Get. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 15; Corfu Channel, 1984
I.C.J. 15. See generally Waldock, Forum Prorogatum or Acceptance of a Unilateral Summons to
Appear before the International Court, 2 INT. L.Q. 377 (1948).
26. The term "Optional Clause" is an inaccurate description. The original "Optional Clause" was
a special protocol attached to the 1920 Protocol of Signature of the Statute of the Permanent Court,
which served as a form for declarations under Article 36 of the Permanent Court's statute. The Statute of
the present Court contains no protocol of signature, but provides for declarations to be deposited with
the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Thus, there is no longer an Optional Clause in the former
sense, and the term is now used to refer to Article 36, paragraph 2 itself. Merrills, The Optional Clause
Today, 1979 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 87, 88 n.1. The wording of the clause is almost identical to the
jurisdictional provision which preceded it in the Statute of the Permanent Court. Consequently, the
Permanent Court's jurisdictional interpretations of the former clause, by analogy, are accorded
persuasive precedential authority in ICJ decisions. For a history of the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Permanent Court, see generally M. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
1920-1942: A TREATISE 449-82 (1972); Loder, The Permanent Court of International Justice and
1149
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Statute: parties to the Statute may, by declaration, recognize the Court's
compulsory jurisdiction in certain classes of international legal diputes. 27
Although jurisdiction under the Optional Clause is referred to as an
exercise of the Court's "compulsory jurisdiction," it is in reality another
manifestation of the consensual basis of ICJ jurisdiction. The Court may
exercise compulsory jurisdiction over only those states which have ex-
pressly consented to the Optional Clause.28 When a state deposits a declara-
tion with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in accordance with
Article 36, paragraph 4 of the Statute,29 it immediately 30 has the right to
institute proceedings against other states which are parties to the system,
and the obligation to submit to the Court's jurisdiction when it is invoked
by such other states. In effect, consent to the Optional Clause system is
tantamount to a waiver of a state's absolute sovereignty. 31 Thus, in theory,
compulsory jurisdiction is a powerful procedure for the pacific settlement
of international disputes. In practice, however, reluctance of States to
deposit and maintain declarations under Article 36, paragraph 2, together
with the tendency of States to qualify their acceptances with reservations,
Compulsory Jurisdiction, 1921-1922 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 6; Richards, The Jurisdiction of the Permanent
Court of International Justice, 1921-1922 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1. For a discussion of the technical
differences between the two Statutes, see S. ROSENNE, supra note 15, at 367-69.
27. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 36, para. 2. Four classes of disputes are
specified:
(a) the interpretation of a treaty; (b) any question of international law; (c) the existence of any fact
which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; (d) the nature or
extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.
Id. The system of the Optional Clause enables the jurisdiction of the Court to be recognized by
"unilateral adherance to a multilateral act." INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE 36 (1976).
Article 36, paragraph 5 of the Statute provides that declarations made under the Statute of the
Permanent Court and still in force are deemed, as between the parties to the Statute of the ICJ, to be
acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ for the period in which they still have to run and in
accordance with their terms.
28. For purposes of this Comment, the term "compulsory jurisdiction" will be used interchangea-
bly with the term "Optional Clause" to refer to jurisdiction under Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Statute.
In some contexts, the term refers to situations "where a conventional title of jurisdiction under Article
36(1) permits the institution of proceedings by application." S. ROSEMNE, supra note 15, at 312 n.l.
29. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 36, para. 4 ("Such declarations shall be
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the
parties to the Statute and the Registrar of the Court.").
30 A State accepting the jurisdiction of the Court must expect that an Application may be filed
against it before the Court by a new declarant State on the same day on which that State deposits
with the Secretary-General its Declaration of Acceptance. For it is on that very day that the
consensual bond, which is the basis of the Optional Clause, comes into being between the
States concerned.
Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1957 I.C.J. 125,146 (Preliminary Objections).
31. See Note, Nicaragua v. United States in the International Court of Justice: Compulsory
Jurisdiction or Just Compulsion?, 8 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 471, 508-09 (1985).
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enfeeble the ideal of the Optional Clause system. 32
Over the years, the number of states recognizing the compulsory juris-
diction of the Court has declined both relatively and absolutely.33 Com-
mentators and the Court have expressed concern over this unwillingness on
the part of states to make declarations under the Optional Clause. 34 This
concern, in part, resulted in two revisions of the Rules of the Court. 35
Equally disturbing, and more threatening to the functioning of the Optional
Clause system, is the frequent qualification of acceptances of the Optional
Clause by the insertion of far-reaching reservations in declarations. 36
C. Reservations and Conditions
By its terms, paragraph 3 of Article 36 of the Statute permits the
inclusion of conditions regarding reciprocity and time limits upon the
32. See Waldock, Decline ofthe Optional Clause, 1957 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L. L. 244passim; Merrills,-
supra note 26, at 87.
Additionally, there has been a general reluctance on the part of states to submit disputes to the two
international courts. The Permanent Court dealt with 51 contentious cases in 17 years. The ICJ has dealt
with approximately that number in 40 years. Of these, only a small percentage resulted in final
judgment on the merits. See L. KREINDLER, WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW AND LAWYERS 13 n.1 (1974);
Sofaer Statement, supra note 4, at 68. These caseloads have been decried as "dismal." L. KREINDLER,
supra, at 13. For discussions of this reluctance and the reasons therefore, see generally Claude, States
and the World Court: The Politics ofNeglect, II VA. J. INT'L L. 344 (1971); Fitzmaurice, Enlargement of
the Contentious Jurisdiction of the Court, in 2 FUTURE OF THE ICJ, supra note 5, at 461; Gross, The
International Court of Justice: Consideration of Requirements for Enhancing Its Role in the Interna-
tional Legal Order, in 1 FUTURE OF THE ICJ, supra note 5, at 22; Jessup, The International Court of
Justice Revisited, 11 VA. J. INTL L. 299 (1971).
33. Today, the figure has fallen to less than 30%: 47 of the 162 states entitled to accept the Court's
compulsory jurisdiction now do so. See Sofaer Statement, supra note 4, at 68. To put it mildly, "[t]his
compares very unfavorably" with the highwater mark of declarations under the Permanent Court, which
in 1934 had 42 states recognizing compulsoryjurisdiction out of 54 in the League. Gross, supra note 32,
at 30; Waldock, supra note 32, at 245.
34. See, e.g., Fitzmaurice, supra note 32, at461-70; Gross, supra note 32; C.W. JENKS, supra note
5, at 2-3; Weissberg, The Role of the International Court of Justice in the United Nations System: The
First Quarter Century, in 1 FUTURE OF THE ICJ, supra note 5, at 131, 161-63.
35. On May 10, 1972 the Rules of Court were amended and renumbered. On April 14, 1978 the
Court adopted revised rules. For analyses of the effects of these changes, see generally Hambro, Will
the RevisedRules of CourtLeadto Greater Willingness on the Part of Prospective Clients?, in I FUTURE
OF THE ICJ, supra note 5, at 365; Rosenne, Some Reflections on the 1978 Revised Rules of the
International Court of Justice, 19 CoLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 235 (1981).
36. Merrills, supra note 26, at 87. For purposes of this Comment, the term "reservation" will be
deemed to include "reservations, conditions, exclusions, exceptions or limitations on the jurisdiction
recognized by the Declaration." Briggs, Reservations to the Acceptance of Compulsory Jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice, 93 RECUEtL DES COURs 223, 230 (1958-1). The term "condition" is
used to describe "stipulations relating to the force of the declaration as an instrument." S. ROSENNE,
supra note 15, at 389. Hereinafter, conditions will be subsumed usually, but not invariably, in the term
"reservations."
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duration of a declaration. 37 The Statute nowhere refers to the possibility or
right of making reservations excluding certain disputes, matters, or parties
from an acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction. 38 However, it has been
generally recognized that states have an inherent right to qualify their
declarations under the Optional Clause by forms of reservations other than
those provided for in the Statute. 39 State practice and decisions of the ICJ
have established the permissibility of particular reservations. 40 However,
two overriding principles have emerged as qualifications on the scope and
application of reservations: reciprocity of effect and consistency with the
object and purpose of the Statute. 41
1. The Principle of Reciprocity
A basic provision of the Statute applying to every declaration under the
Optional Clause is the principle of reciprocity. This principle derives from
the language of the Optional Clause itself, under which every declaration is
expressed to operate only "in relation to any other State accepting the same
obligation. ,,42 Although the Court has not so stated, reciprocity is consid-
ered to be an inherent condition in every declaration under the Optional
Clause, even in a declaration expressed to be made "unconditionally."
43
37. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 36, para. 3 ("The declarations referred
to above may be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain
States, or for a certain time."). In this context, a "condition of reciprocity" means a condition that a
declaration will not come into force unless and until a certain number of states, or certain named states
have made declarations accepting the Optional Clause. Brazil is the only state ever to use this form of
condition. Waldock, supra note 32, at 255.
38. At the founding conferences of both the Permanent Court and the ICJ, it was seriously argued
that jurisdiction should be, without exception, truly compulsory. See R.P. ANAND, COMPULSORY
JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 30-44 (1961).
39. See R.P. ANAND, supra note 38, at 187-89.
40. Briggs, supra note 36, at 233. This practice also was recognized in resolutions of the League of
Nations and by the subcommittee of the San Francisco Conference.
As is well known, the article has consistently been interpreted in the past as allowing states
accepting the jurisdiction of the Court to subject their declarations to reservations. The Subcom-
mittee has considered such interpretation as being henceforth established. It has therefore been
considered unnecessary to modify paragraph 3 in order to make express reference to the right of
the states to make such reservations.
Doe. 702, 13 U.N.C.I.O. 559 (1945). See also 10 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 1671 (1928).
41. A subsidiary principle-non-retroactivity-provides that the Court can never be divested of
jurisdiction retrospectively. See Nottebohm (Liecht. v. Guat.), 1953 I.C.J. I11, 123 (Preliminary
Objection). This principle primarily applies to situations involving termination and variation of
declarations.
42. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 36, para. 2 (emphasis added).
43. Waldock, supra note 32, at 255. But see S. ROSENNE, supra note 15, at 384:
[lI]t has been suggested that Article 36(3), with its reference to 'unconditionally', makes it possible
for reciprocity to be excluded ifa State so wills: the implication of this view is that reciprocity is not
inherent, but has to be specifically mentioned.
See also Briggs, supra note 36, at 239-42 (citing contrary authority).
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The Court has interpreted Article 36 to require thatwhen the Court is seised
of a dispute on the basis of compulsory jurisdiction, the reservations of
each declaration will be binding on both parties, in the sense that each party
is entitled to invoke any relevant reservation appearing in either party's
declaration.44 In practice, this means that in a given dispute, the common
jurisdictional ground upon which the parties consent is delimited by the
declaration that accepts the Court's compulsory jurisdiction within nar-
rower limits, as measured by the impact of its reservations. 45
Although the Court's interpretations of reciprocity have been consistent
over a long period of time, 46 the application of the doctrine is hardly
crystallized, as demonstrated in the recent Paramilitary Activities case.47
For the first time, the Court held that declarations are governed under the
44. S. RosENNE, supra note 15, at 386. Compare this "principle of reciprocity" with the "con-
dition of reciprocity", supra note 37 (the condition of reciprocity is a statutorily recognized reservation,
as opposed to a jurisdictional doctrine).
45. In the first case to discuss the principle of reciprocity, the Court stated that itsjurisdiction "only
exists within the limits within which it has been accepted." Phosphates in Morocco (Italy v. Fr.), 1938
P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 74, at 27 (Preliminary Objections). The Court concluded that it did not have
jurisdiction to decide the dispute, since the violation had not occurred within the temporal limits
imposed by a reservation appearing in one of the declarations. The issue of reciprocity was more
directly addressed in Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria (Buig. v. Belg.), 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/
B) No. 78, at 81 (Preliminary Objection), where the Permanent Court determined that a Belgian
reservation could be invoked by Bulgaria under the doctrine of reciprocity.
The ICJ cases involving the substance of reciprocity have developed the doctrine along similar lines.
In Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9, 23-24 the Court first noted that it would follow
the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court in Phosphates in Morocco and Electricity Company, and its
own judgment in Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93 (Preliminary Objection).
The Norwegian Loans opinion further refined the doctrine by establishing that the principle of
reciprocity operates not to enable the respondent to invoke the applicant's reservation as drafted, but to
invoke its substance as applied to the respondent. See S. RosENNE, supra note 15, at 386. This
refinement continued in Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1957 I.C.J. 125, 144
(Preliminary Objections), where the Court held that no violation of the reciprocity principle is
committed by the filing of a "surprise" application, and that any jurisdictional rights which a state can
claim for itself can be invoked against it for the duration of its own acceptance. The clearest definition of
reciprocity appears in Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J. 6, 23 (Preliminary Objections):
Reciprocity in the case of Declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court enables
a Party to invoke a reservation to that acceptance which it has not expressed in its own Declaration
but which the other Party has expressed in its Declaration. . . . Reciprocity enables the State
which has made the wider acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court to rely upon the reservations
to the acceptance laid down by the other Party.
46. S. ROSENNE, supra note 15, at 387.
47. 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Judgment of Nov. 26).
The ICI is not bound by the principle of stare decicis to follow its own or the Permanent Court's
precedents. Article 59, as applied by Article 38, paragraph l(d) of the Statute, limits the binding force of
an ICJ decision to the parties in a particular case. Furthermore, Article 38, paragraph l(d) relegates
judicial decisions to the status of "subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law." STATUTE OF
THEINTERNATIONAL COURT OFJusTIcE, art. 38, para. 1. In practice, however, the Court consistently cites
its own previous judgments and those of the Permanent Court, and has created a "remarkable unity of
precedent." Winiarski, 1961-1962 I.C.J.Y.B. 1, 2 (1962). See also S. ROSENNE, supra note 15, at
611-14.
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treaty principle of good faith, 48 and that reciprocity does not apply to "the
formal conditions of their creation, duration or extinction. " 49 Accordingly,
not all reservations can be reciprocally invoked.
2. The Consistency of Reservations with Article 36: the Object and
Purpose Test
Article 36, paragraph 6 of the Court's Statute provides that: "In the event
of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be
settled by the decision of the Court." 50 On its face, this provision simply
embodies the established principle of international law that every interna-
tional tribunal has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction (compg-
tence de la compgtence).51 In theory, this means that Article 36, paragraph
6 provides the ICJ with a measure of judicial control over the preliminary
question of the validity of reservations, and their compatibility with the
object and purpose of the Optional Clause.52 In practice, the compatibility
48. Paramilitary Activities, 1984 I.C.J. at 420.
49. Id. at 419. These findings have attracted some criticism. See, e.g., Note, supra note 31, at 484
("It was not until the Nicaraguan dispute arose ... that the World Court made a dramatic shift in
approach."). Judge Schwebel emphasized in his dissenting opinion in Paramilitary Activities that the
Court had never previously come to such a conclusion. He claimed that reciprocity should apply to
temporal provisions, and cited two Permanent Court decisions, one ICJ decision, and two scholarly
works in support of his position. Paramilitary Activities, 1984 I.C.J. at 626 (Schwebel, J., dissenting)
(citing Anglo-Iranian Oil, 1952 I.C.J. at 103; Electricity Company, 1939 P.C.I.J. at 81; Phosphates in
Morocco, 1938 P.C.I.J. at 22; Waldock, supra note 31, at 258-61; Steinberger, The International Court
of Justice, in JUDICIAL SETrLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES 193 (H. Mosler & R. Bernhardt eds.
1974)). But see I. SHIHATA, THE POWER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT TO DETERMINE ITS OWN
JURISDICTION 151 (1965) (a party cannot rely upon a condition in its opponent's declaration).
50. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 36, para. 6.
51. S. ROSENNE, supra note 15, at 439. See also Nottebohm (Liecht. v. Guat.), 1953 I.C.J. 111, 119
(Preliminary Objection). See generally I. SHIHATA, supra note 49.
52. In addition to adjudicatory challenge, objections to the admissibility of a reservation can be
made by diplomatic means. The Secretary-General, pursuant to his Article 36, paragraph 4 function as
depository of declarations, circulates all such observations sent to him by a state, regarding the terms of
a declaration of another state, to all parties to the Statute. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE, art. 36, para. 4 ("Such declarations shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the parties to the Statute and to the Registrar of the
Court."). For an analysis of the effect of state practice on the interpretation of reservations, see
Crawford, The Legal Effect of Automatic Reservations to the Jurisdiction of the International Court,
1979 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 63, 81.
One instance of a diplomatic challenge to a reservation on object and purpose grounds occurred in
1955. Sweden objected to the same Portuguese reservation that the Court subsequently held to be not
inconsistent with the Statute. See infra note 77. Sweden claimed that the condition nullified "the
obligation intended by the wording of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute," Annexes to Preliminary
Objection (Port. v. India) 1960 I.C.J. Pleadings (1 Right of Passage Over Indian Territory) 217 (Letter of
Feb. 23, 1956), and was incompatible with a recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
The Portuguese reply disputed the Swedish interpretation and stated that "[in any case, the Court alone
is competent to pronounce on the validity of these declarations." Id. at 218 (Letter of July 5, 1956).
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issue has received far more attention from commentators than from the
Court.53
The foremost advocate of a strict application of compatibility review,
Judge Lauterpacht, 54 maintained that the Court has a duty to consider,
proprio motu, a reservation's validity. Judge Lauterpacht believed the
Court should be guided by the principle of comp~tence de la comp~tence of
Article 36, paragraph 6, and the principle of obligation, which he regarded
as fundamental to Article 36, paragraph 2.55 Compdtence de la compe-
tence, as applied to a particular reservation, dictates that a reservation
cannot be used to deprive the Court of power to determine its jurisdiction.56
The principle of obligation derives from the language "accepting the same
obligation" in Article 36, paragraph 2.57 It purportedly invalidates reserva-
tions that leave to the party making the declaration the right to determine
the extent or existence of its obligation to submit to the jurisdiction of the
Court. 58
Central to Judge Lauterpacht's argument is the position that reservations
are not severable from a declaration of acceptance. 59 Therefore, if a
reservation is in some way invalid, the whole declaration is ineffective as an
acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction. The Lauterpacht view has received
significant critical acceptance, 60 but the Court itself has never wholly
53. See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 52, at68-83. Onecommentatordismisses the whole issue with
a greater-includes-the-lesser argument: "Surely, if a party to the Court's compulsory jurisdiction can
refuse to accept that jurisdiction altogether, it should be able to accept any lesser jurisdiction."
D'Amato, The United States ShouldAccept, by a New Declaration, the General Compulsory Jurisdic-
tion of the World Court, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 331, 335 (1986).
54. See Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9, 43-66 (separate opinion of
Lauterpacht, J.); Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J. 6, 101-19 (Lauterpacht, J., dissenting); see
also Lauterpacht, The British Reservation to the Optional Clause, 10 ECONOMICA 137, 168-69 (1930).
55. Crawford, supra note 52, at 74-75. See also S. RosENNE, supra note 15, at 373-74 (mutuality
of obligation is an essential element of compulsory jurisdiction).
56. Norwegian Loans, 1957 I.C.J. at 47 (Lauterpacht, J., dissenting).
57. Crawford, supra note 52, at 74; S. RosENNE, supra note 15, at 373.
58. Norwegian Loans, 1957 I.C.J. at 48. See also Interhandel, 1959 I.C.J. at 101:
[ljrrespective of its inconsistency with the Statute, [a] reservation by effectively conferring upon
[a state] the right to determine with finality whether in any particular case it is under an obligation
to accept the jurisdiction of the Court, deprives the Declaration of Acceptance of the character of a
legal instrument, cognizable before a judicial tribunal, expressing legal rights and obligations
59. Id. at 43-44.
60. Crawford, supra note 52, at 65 nn.4, 5 (contrast footnotes 4 and 5).
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adopted this approach. 61 Indeed, the Court has never declared a reservation
to be invalid. 62
D. Reservations in State Practice
For purposes of conceptual differentiation, four broad categories of
reservations have been recognized: reservations regarding termination and
modification; 63 reservations ratione temporis (temporal reservations); res-
ervations ratione personae (reservations as to parties); and reservations
ratione materiae (subject-matter reservations). 64 As the history and prac-
tice of reservations has been well-documented, 65 the following will give
only a brief overview of the respective categories.
Article 36, paragraph 3 of the Statute provides that declarations may be
made "unconditionally . . . or for a certain time." 66 Acceptance of the
Court's jurisdiction for a fixed period clearly amounts to a declaration "for
a certain time," pursuant to Article 36. However, declarations may be
terminated in several other ways. Declarations that do not expressly provide
for termination, and those that are terminable on notice have both been
subject to varying interpretations. 67
Thirteen declarations currently contain no provision for termination. 68
Until recently, the Court had not spoken authoritatively on the issue of how
61. A dictum in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case referring to "the close and nessessary link
that always exists between a jurisdictional clause and reservations to it," provides some confirmation of
the inseverability view. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J. 1, 33 (Judgment of
Dec. 19). But see I. SHIHATA, supra note 49, at 296 ("Nothing in the practice of the Court suggests that it
will be inclined to follow the Lauterpacht theory.").
62. The only instance in the history of the two Courts of adjudication on the validity of a reservation
occurred in Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1957 I.C.J. 125 (Preliminary
Objections). It was argued that a certain reservation was incompatible with the the Optional Clause, so
that the whole declaration was invalid as an acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction. Id. at 141. The ICJ
upheld the validity of a Portuguese reservation and therefore found it unnecessary to decide the
severability issue. Id. at 144. The Court did, however, assert authority to "determine the meaning and
the effect" of the reservation "by reference to its actual wording and applicable principles of law." Id. at
142. Although the "applicable principles of law" were not specified, the Court did examine the
reservation's practical implications in terms of Article 36, and reached the conclusion that it was "1not
inconsistent with the Statute." Id. at 141. On applicable principles of law and interpretation of
declarations, see generally S. ROSENNE. supra note 15, at 405-18; Crawford, supra note 52, at 75-83.
63. Reservations regarding termination and modification, since they relate to the force of the
declaration as an instrument, are more properly termed "conditions."
64. See B leicher, ICJ Jurisdiction: Some New Considerations and a Proposed American Declara-
tion, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 61, 70 (1967).
65. See generally R.P. ANAND, supra note 38, at 187-248; Merrills, supra note 26; Waldock, supra
note 32.
66. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 36, para. 3.
67. See Note, Termination of Declarations Under the Optional Clause: Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 557, 564-65 & n.61 (1985).
68. Declarations of Botswana, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Haiti, Honduras, Malawi.
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, Senegal, Uganda, and Uruguay, 1984-1985 I.C.J.Y.B. 66-101 (1985).
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such declarations may be terminated. In Paramilitary Activities69 the ma-
jority concluded that declarations under the Optional Clause "establish a
series of bilateral engagements" 70 and, by analogy to the law of treaties, are
governed under the principle of good faith. Thus, such declarations are
subject to an implicit requirement of "reasonable" notice. 71
Twenty-two declarations are now effectively terminable from the mo-
ment of notification. 72 The damaging effect of instantaneously terminable
declarations on the compulsory jurisdiction system has been widely recog-
nized. 73 Although such conditions are valid, 74 their effect is limited by the
Nottebohm principle, which provides that modification or termination of a
declaration cannot deprive the Court of jurisdiction in a case of which it is
already seised.75
Seventeen states currently reserve a right to modify the terms of their
declarations with immediate effect. 76 The Court has established the propo-
sition that the reservation of a right to vary or denounce a declaration is
lawful. 77 Nonetheless, this type of reservation is clearly open to the same
objections as a provision for termination on immediate notice.
Reservations ratione temporis limit jurisdiction by preventing the com-
pulsory litigation of issues based on a dispute or facts arising prior to or
69. 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Judgment of Nov. 26).
70. Id. at 418.
71. Id. at 420. The Court did not elaborate on what constitutes reasonable notice, although in
dictum indicated that three days notice would be insufficient. Id. at 419-20.
72. See declarations of Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Canada, Democratic Kampuchea,
Gambia, India, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Malta, Mauritius, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal,
Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, and United Kingdom, 1984-1985 I.C.J.Y.B. 66-101 (1985). This is
nearly one-half of the declarations currently in force.
73. D'Amato, supra note 5, at 389-92 (creating "hit-and-run" and "last-minute withdrawal"
problems); Merrills, supra note 26, at 92-93 ("incompatible with a resolute commitment to the Court's
jurisdiction"); Waldock, supra note 32, at 266-68 ("tend to undermine the whole purpose of the
Optional Clause").
74. See Note, supra note 67, at 564.
75. See supra note 41.
76. See declarations of Australia, Austria, Botswana, Canada, El Salvador, Kenya, Malawi,
Malta, Mauritius, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Somalia, Swaziland, Togo, and United
Kingdom 1984-1985 I.C.J.Y.B. 66-101 (1985). The reservations of New Zealand and Norway are
limited to amendments "in light of the results of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea in respect of the settlement of disputes." Id. at 88-89, 90.
77. The right to modify a declaration on notice was challenged in Right of Passage Over Indian
Territory (Port. v. India), 1957 I.C.J. 125 (Preliminary Objections). The Portuguese declaration
reserved the right "to exclude from the scope of the present declaration, at any time during its validity,
any given category or categories of disputes, by notifying the Secretary-General of the United Nations
and with effect from the moment of such notification." 1984-1985 I.C.J.Y.B. 93 (1985) (text of the
Portuguese Declaration, para. 3). The Court upheld the reservation. Right of Passage, 1957 I.C.J. at
144.
There is, however, no inherent or reciprocal right to modify in the absence of a reservation. See infra
text accompanying notes 105 & 110; Note, supra, note 67, at 565-66.
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during specified dates. Twenty-one declarations currently contain such a
limitation. 78 These reservations are intended to serve a number of different
objectives. 79 One notably objectionable function is that of ensuring that
only events subsequent to the filing of the declaration can be the subject of
the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. 80 In international law, few controver-
sies are without significant historical origin. Thus, these limitations have
the effect, increased by the principle of reciprocity, of drastically reducing
the scope of compulsory jurisdiction. 81 The Court has limited this effect by
interpreting these reservations restrictively. 82
The effect of reservations rationepersonae is to exclude from the Court's
compulsory jurisdiction disputes with certain parties. The reservations
falling within this category are varied. 83 A relatively common example is
the reservation of disputes among members of the British Common-
wealth. 84 The Court has never had an opportunity to evaluate such a
reservation.
Reservations ratione materiae have the effect of excluding disputes
involving a specified subject matter. Included in this group are reservations
covering disputes for which some other means of peaceful settlement has
been agreed, 85 disputes arising out of some form of belligerency, 86 disputes
arising under multilateral treaties, 87 and particularized disputes. 88 The
most significant reservations in this category are those that reserve matters
within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. These reservations are of two
types: objective and subjective. Those in the objective form simply reserve
78. See declarations of Barbados, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, El Salvador, Finland, Gambia,
India, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Mexico, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philip-
pines, Sudan, Sweden, and United Kingdom, 1984-1985 I.C.J.Y.B. 66-101 (1985).
79. See Merrills, supra note 26, at 96-101. The first objective is to prevent the litigation of stale
disputes, or the reopening of past controversies. This serves the function of a statute of limitations. Id. at
96. A second objective is to except disputes arising out of a particular period of national history. Id.
80. Id. at 97.
81. "[W]hen combined with the right to vary or terminate the declaration without notice, [these
reservations] must bring into question the seriousness of a State's commitment to the Court." Merrills,
supra note 26, at 97. The negative effect of these conditions diminishes with the passage of time, and
the condition takes on the role of preventing litigation of stale disputes.
82. Id. at 101. See Interhandel, 1959 I.C.J. at 20-22; Right of Passage, 1957 I.C.J. at 36.
83. See generally Merrills, supra note 26, at 101-05.
84. See the declarations of Canada, Gambia, India, Kenya, Malta, Mauritius, and the United
Kingdom. 1984-1985 I.C.J.Y.B. 66-101 (1985).
85. See, e.g., the declarations of Barbados, Israel, Liberia, and Swaziland, id.
86. See, e.g., the declarations of El Salvador, India, Israel, and Kenya, id.
87. See, e.g., declarations of El Salvador, India, Malta, and the Philippines, id.
88. See, e.g., declaration of Canada, id. at 69-70, para. (d) ("disputes arising out of or concerning
jurisdiction or rights claimed or exercised by Canada in respect of the conservation, management or
exploitation of the living resources of the sea, or in respect of the prevention or control of pollution or
contamination of the marine environment in marine areas adjacent to the coasts of Canada").
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matters "exclusively" ' 89 or "essentially" 90 within the domestic jurisdic-
tion.91 These reservations leave it to the Court to decide whether the
reservation is applicable to a specific dispute. 92
The effects of the subjective form of the domestic jurisdiction reservation
("automatic reservation" or "self-judging reservation") "are among the
most discussed issues in the literature of the Court.", 93 Five declarations
currently include a reservation in this form. 94 The reservation vests in the
declarant state the power to determine whether a matter comes within its
own domestic jurisdiction, to be exercised even after a dispute has been
submitted to the Court. Although automatic reservations have been almost
universally criticized, 95 the Court seems implicitly to have recognized their
validity and effect. 96
II. THE UNITED STATES AND COMPULSORY JURISDICTION
In 1946, the administration of President Harry S. Truman, with the
advice and consent of the Senate, deposited a declaration of acceptance of
the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ,97 the text of which contained a
number of significant reservations.98 Throughout six successive United
States administrations, the 1946 Declaration remained in its original form.
Although the system of compulsory jurisdiction, as well as the ICJ itself,
was often the subject of political and scholarly criticism, 99 the United
States remained steadfast in its commitment to the moral and practical
89. See, e.g., declaration of Barbados, id. at 59.
90. See, e.g., declaration of Botswana, id. at 60.
91. The effects of the two variations are identical. Merrills, supra note 26, at 112-13.
92. S. RoSENNE, supra note 15, at 393.
93. Crawford, supra note 52, at 63. The reservation was originated as the "Connally Amendment"
to United States Declaration of 1946, excluding "disputes with regard to matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by the United States of
America." 1946 Declaration, supra note 2. See infra text accompanying notes 133-43.
94. Declarations of Liberia, Malawi, Mexico, the Philippines, and Sudan, 1984-1985 I.C.J.Y.B.
66-101 (1985).
95. See Crawford, supra note 52, at 64 ("resulting in a fragmented, uncertain and subjective
jurisdiction capable of easy evasion"); Gross, supra note 32, at 38 ("expressing a lack of confidence in
the Court"). In Norwegian Loans, 1957 I.C.J. at 43-66 (separate opinion of Lauterpacht, J.), and
Interhandel, 1959 I.C.J. at 101-19 (Lauterpacht, J., dissenting), Judge Lauterpacht argued that the
subjective domestic jurisdiction reservation is invalid and incompatible with the system of compulsory
jurisdiction.
96. See Crawford, supra note 52, at 64-68.
97. 1946 Declaration, supra note 2.
98. See infra note 120.
99. Rogers, supra note 5, at 285.
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considerations that prompted the 1946 Declaration. 100 These considera-
tions are many and varied. Foremost is the belief that adherence to the
Optional Clause system by the United States serves the national interest by
promoting and stabilizing international law.' 0' Additionally, voluntary
submission to compulsory jurisdiction implicitly creates the appearance of
adherence to these high ideals. 102 These considerations notwithstanding,
the ICJ's jurisdictional decision in Paramilitary Activities created and
exacerbated certain subsidiary, albeit serious, criticisms of the Court and
of the United States commitment to compulsory jurisdiction. 103
On April 6, 1984, three days before and presumably in anticipation of
the filing of Nicaragua's application, the United States Secretary of State
deposited with the Secretariat of the United Nations a letter purporting to
modify, with immediate effect, the 1946 Declaration by withdrawing
consent to the jurisdiction of the Court in cases arising out of "disputes
with any Central American state" for a period of two years (hereinafter
referred to as 1984 Notification). 10 4
The United States subsequently interposed this attempted modification
at the jurisdictional phase of the Paramilitary Activities case, claiming an
inherent right to modify its declaration on notice. 105 The United States also
raised technical issues disputing the existence of jurisdiction 0 6 and ad-
vanced a number of grounds of inadmissibility. 107 These arguments, as well
100. See generally Strengthening the International Court of Justice, Hearings on S. Res. 74, S.
Res. 75, S. Res. 76, S. Res. 77, and S. Res. 78 Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973); Compulsory Jurisdiction, International Court ofJustice, Hearings on S. Res. 94 Before
the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960) [hereinafter Hearings on S. Res. 94];
Compulsory Jurisdiction, International Court ofJustice, Hearings on S. Res. 196 Before a Subcomm. of
the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
101. Rogers, supra note 5, at 287, 291.
102. The appearance of promoting international law is also perceived as an advantageous consid-
eration. The United States often indicates stronger support for an active ICJ than is suggested by its
history of recourse to the Court. Note, International Conflict Resolution: The ICJ Chambers and the
Gulf of Maine Dispute, 23 VA. J. INT'L. L. 463, 475 & n.82 (1983). See also Report of the Secretary-
General, supra note 5, at 9, para. 11 (views expressed by the United States of America); Malloy,
Developments at the International Court of Justice: Provisional Measures and Jurisdiction in the
Nicaragua Case, 6 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 55, 91 & nn.217-18 (1984).
103. See Sofaer Statement, supra note 4, at 69 ("None of the weaknesses deriving from the Court's
composition and our 1946 declaration is new.").
104. See Letter from Secretary of State Schultz to the Secretary-General of the United Nations
(Apr. 6, 1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 670 (1984), also reprinted in 1984-1985 I.C.J.Y.B. 99-100
(1985) [hereinafter 1984 Notification].
105. See infra text accompanying notes 159-60.
106. Paramilitary Activities, 1984 I.C.J. at 400.
107. Paramilitary Activities, 1984 I.C.J. at 429. An objection to the admissibility of a claim
challenges an applicant's right to invoke jurisdiction in the circumstances of the case, as distinguished
from lack of jurisdiction. See I. SHIHATA, supra note 49, at 107-12.
In pertinent part, the United States alleged that: (1) Nicaragua had failed to bring before the Court
three "indispensable parties;" (2) the dispute was essentially within the competence of the United
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as the majority's premises for its decision to assert jurisdiction in Paramili-
tary Activities, 108 have been well-documented and critiqued. 0 9 In separate
votes, the Court found, by eleven votes to five, that it had jurisdiction "on
the basis of Article 36, paragraphs 2 and 5, of the Statute of the Court,"
thereby rejecting the attempt to rely on the 1984 Notification; 10 and, by
fourteen votes to two, that it had jurisdiction on the basis of provisions of
the 1956 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the
United States and Nicaragua. 11 By a unanimous vote of sixteen judges, the
Court rejected five separate grounds of alleged inadmissibility. 112 Addi-
tionally, the Court held that the Vandenberg Multilateral Treaty reservation
was no preliminary bar to consideration of the merits of Nicaragua's
claim. 113
On January 18, 1985, after the Court had upheld its jurisdiction to hear
the complaint, the government of the United States announced that it would
not participate further in the case, stating that "[t]he Court's decision of
November 26, 1984, finding that it has jurisdiction, is contrary to law and
fact. "114 The United States further noted that the developments leading up
to the withdrawal compelled it to "clarify our 1946 acceptance of the
Court's jurisdiction." 115 On October 7, 1985, the State Department an-
nounced that the United States had terminated the 1946 Declaration sub-
mitting to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. 116
Nations Security Council, not the Court; (3) the concept of "collective self-defence" could not be
subjected to judicial examination in the midst of the conflict; (4) the limited factfinding capability of the
Court in situations involving ongoing conflict rendered judicial settlement inappropriate; and (5) there
is no requirement of exhaustion of regional negotiating processes as a precondition to seising the Court.
See Briggs, Nicaragua v. United States: Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 79 AM. L INT'L L. 373, 375
(1985) (summary of pleas to admissibility).
108. The Court decided, by a vote of 15 to 1, that it had jurisdiction to entertain the case.
Paramilitary Activities, 1984 I.C.J at 442.
109. See, e.g., Briggs, supra note 107; Chayes, Nicaiagua, The United States, and the World
Court, 85 CowUM. L. Rav. 1444 (1985); D'Amato, Nicaragua andInternational Law: The "Academic"
and the "Real," 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 657 (1985); Franck, Icy Day at the ICJ, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 379
(1985); Kirgis, Nicaragua v. United States as a Precedent, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 652 (1985); Malloy, supra
note 102; Reisman, Has the International Court Exceeded its Jurisdiction?, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 128
(1986); Note, supra note 31; Note, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. UnitedStates): TheInternational Court ofJustice's Jurisdictional Dilemma, 7 Loy. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 379 (1984); Note, Applying the Critical Jurisprudence of International Law to the
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 71 VA. L. REv. 1183
(1985); Case and Comment, 44 CAMBRDGE L.L 183 (1985).
110. Paramilitary Activities, 1984 I.C.J. at 442.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Paramilitary Activities, 1984 I.C.L at 425-26.
114. Statement on Withdrawal, supra note 4, at 64.
115. Id. at65.
116. Statement on Termination, supra note 4.
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III. PROPOSALS AND ANALYSIS
If the United States is ever to submit a new declaration of acceptance
under Article 36 of the Statute, it is unlikely to be in the same form as the
1946 Declaration. Before any United States administration submits such an
instrument, it will need to be convinced of that instrument's effectiveness,
and additional reservations will need to be demonstrably protective of the
national interest. 117 On the other hand, the structure of the Statute limits the
scope of permissible reservations. 118 Therefore, untested reservations must
be examined in light of forty years of state practice and ICJ decisions. All
reservations circumscribe the scope of compulsory jurisdiction, and in
varying degrees express a lack of confidence in the Court. Therefore, from
the perspective of strengthening the international rule of law and increasing
the role of binding adjudication of international legal disputes, anything
but an unqualified acceptance of the Optional Clause is subject to crit-
icism. 119
The advisability of any particular reservation is a function of balancing
the benefits and risks. Part III of this Comment analyzes the reservations
contained in the 1946 Declaration in order to determine whether they have
any continuing vitality, and proposes several reservations to a hypothetical
United States declaration that arguably would be practicable and effective.
Several other proposals are examined and found to be ineffective in light of
the applicable criteria. The reservations are examined for consonance with
the national interest of the United States in light of a) the administration's
reasons for withdrawal from the Paramilitary Activities case and termina-
tion of the 1946 Declaration; b) their offensive effectiveness; and c) their
defensive effectiveness. Offensive effectiveness is measured by a reserva-
tion's potential for being reciprocally invoked against the United States, as
applicant, to divest the Court of jurisdiction, and by the reservation's
general tendency to circumscribe the operational effect of the Optional
Clause. The question of whether the reservation would have prevented
jurisdiction in Paramilitary Activities is used as a rough indicator of
defensive effectiveness. As indicia of validity, the reservations are ana-
lyzed with respect to state practice and relevant Court decisions in deter-
mining compatibility with the object and purpose of the Statute.
117. Since a new declaration would be contingent on the advice and consent of the Senate, it
certainly would be the subject of particularly intense scrutiny.
118. See supra text accompanying note 41.
119. But see infra text accompanying notes 170, 178 & 197 (certain reservations accommodate the
functioning of the Optional Clause, or encourage states to submit declarations).
Some proposals call for unreserved compulsory jurisdiction. See E. DEUTSCH, AN INTERNATIONAL
RULE OF LAW 1-17; Qadeer, The International Court of Justice: A Proposal to Amend its Statute, 5
Hous. J. INT'L L. 35. 39-52 (1982); see also supra note 38.
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A. The 1946 Declaration
The United States Declaration of August 14, 1946 incorporated four
reservations and one condition. 120
1. Limitation to Disputes "Hereafter Arising"
The reservation limiting jurisdiction to disputes "hereafter arising"
ensured that only events subsequent to 1946 could give rise to a dispute
subject to compulsory jurisdiction. Immediately prior to termination, the
declaration was almost forty years old; the effect of this limitation had
considerably diminished, and it functioned primarily as a statute of limita-
tions. 121 However, if a new declaration is deposited with the "hereafter
arising" limitation, it will reduce the period of time subject to the Court's
compulsory jurisdiction by over forty years. This type of exclusion has
been vigorously criticized, 122 although it appears to be permissible and
valid. No ostensible national interest is protected by such a reduction,1 23
and the Court has interpreted this type of reservation restrictively by
observing that "the facts and situations which have led to a dispute must not
be confused with the dispute itself."1 24 The date of the dispute is a difficult
question, particularly in international law. Thus, reservations employing
120. In pertinent part:
[The United States of America recognizes as compulsory ipso facto and without special agree-
ment, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice in all legal disputes hereafter arising...
Provided, that this declaration shall not apply to
(a) disputes the solution of which the Parties shall entrust to other tribunal by virtue of agreements
already in existence or which may be concluded in the future; or
(b) disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the
United States of America as determined by the United States of America; or
(c) disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (1) all the Parties to the treaty affected by the
decision are also Parties to the case before the Court, or (2) the United States of America specially
agrees to jurisdiction; and
Providedfurther, that this declaration shall remain in force for a period of five years and thereafter
until the expiration of six months after notice may be given to terminate this declaration.
1946 Declaration, supra note 2.
121. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Merrills, supra note 26, at 96-101; Macdonald, The New Canadian Declaration of
Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 8 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L.
3, 25-26 (1970).
123. Of course, it is arguably beneficial to foreclose litigation of issues involving certain events in
United States national history, for example, the Vietnam War. However, this argument evinces a fear of
litigating certain subject matters, rather than disputes during a certain time period. Such fears can be
placated through the use of less intrusive subject-matter reservations. Moreover, the argument leads to a
reductio ad absurdum, because in theory, a state could continuously update this limitation, leaving an
inconsequential interval to which compulsory jurisdiction would apply.
124. Interhandel, 1959 I.C.J. at 22.
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the "double exclusion formula," 125 limiting the Court's jurisdiction to
disputes arising both after a certain date, and with regard to situations or
facts subsequent to that date, 126 have fared no better. 127
These reservations are fully subject to reciprocity. 128 Thus, by restricting
the temporal scope of cognizable disputes, they tend to seriously impair the
ability of a State to use compulsory jurisdiction offensively. The United
States should not include a "hereafter arising" type of reservation in a
future declaration. However, to preserve the desirable statute of limitations
function, it would be wise to accept compulsory jurisdiction over disputes
arising after August 26, 1946.
2. Disputes for Which Some Other Means of Settlement Has Been
Agreed
This reservation excepts "disputes the solution of which the Parties shall
entrust to other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in existence or
which may be concluded in the future.' ' 129 Although the Court has never
had occasion to consider this type of reservation, twenty-six of the declara-
tions currently in force incorporate it in some equivalent form. 130 The need
for such a reservation is meager, and the likelihood of it ever being invoked
is small. Under Article 88 of the Rules of Court, the parties to a case are
free to discontinue proceedings at any time by mutual agreement. 131 If the
aim of the reservation is to exclude a dispute in which an application is filed
in violation of an agreement to use some other means of settlement, then
the Court ought to decline to adjudicate the matter on grounds of judicial
125. Meron, Israel's Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice, 4 ISR. L. REv. 307, 327 (1969).
126. See, e.g., declarations of Japan and Sudan, 1984-1985 I.C.J.Y.B. 80, 95 (1985).
127. See Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1957 1.C.J. 125, 151-52 (Prelimin-
ary Objections) (joinder of Preliminary Objection to the merits); Right of Passage Over Indian Territory
(Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 5, 35 (Order of Jan. 6) (rejection of Preliminary Objection). Newer
declarations of El Salvador and India have introduced formulas for an "exclusion ad infinitum,"
reserving "disputes prior to the date of this declaration including any dispute the foundations, reasons,
facts, causes, origins, definitions, allegations or bases of which existed prior to this date .... "
1984-1985 I.C.J.Y.B. 73-75, 77-79 (1985). The Court has not yet interpreted this formulation, but a
literal interpretation suggests that its effect could be to "reduce the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court
almost to the vanishing point." Merills, supra note 26, at 101. It is doubtful that the Court would be
more solicitous toward this limitation than towards those employing the double exclusion formula.
128. I. SHIHATA, supra note 49, at 151.
129. 1946 Declaration, supra note 2.
130. See the declarations of Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Demo-
cratic Kampuchea, El Salvador, Gambia, India, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi,
Malta, Mauritius, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Senegal, Sudan, Swaziland, and
United Kingdom, 1984-1985 I.C.J.Y.B. 66-101 (1985).
13 1. Rules of Court, supra note 16, art. 88.
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propriety. 132 Although it seems hardly conceivable that the Court would
adjudicate such a dispute, the maintenance of this reservation could be seen
as a safety valve against judicial impropriety. Since the condition precedent
to the reservation's invocation is readily determinable, the possibility of
unexpected adverse reciprocity is reduced. The maintenance of this reser-
vation would be, at worst, an instance of benign overprecaution.
3. The Connally Amendment
The United States automatic reservation, sometimes referred to as the
Connally Amendment, 133 is a subjective domestic jurisdiction reserva-
tion 34 which excludes "disputes with regard to matters which are essen-
tially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as
determined by the United States of America .... ",135 It has often been
the subject of intensely negative scholarly commentary, 136 and various
sectors have called for its repeal.137 However, the Court has consistently
given the reservation effect. 138 Although the automatic reservation can be
viewed as the ultimate defensive reservation because it can always be
pleaded, in good or bad faith, to divest the Court of jurisdiction, the
reservation has a serious drawback. Through the principle of reciprocity,
other states can use the reservation to escape from actions brought by the
United States. It has in fact been invoked reciprocally to the embarrassment
of the United States. 139 Although the United States certainly could have
132. Briggs, supra note 34, at 298.
133. This is in reference to its origins in the United States Senate.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 93-96.
135. 1946 Declaration, supra note 2.
136. See Crawford, supra note 52, at 63-64; D'Amato, supra note 5, at 392-94; Gross, supra note
32, at 38-39; Humphrey, The United States, the World Court and the Connally Amendment, 11 VA. J.
INTL L. 3 10, passim (1971); Merrills, supra note 26, at 113-15. But see D. KITCHEL, Too GRAVE A RISK:
THE CONNALLY AMENDMENT IssUE (1963) ("The retention of the Connally Amendment . . . is
essential to the ultimate victory of freedom in the present struggle [with international communism].").
137. See Hearings on S. Res. 94, supra note 100; 1959 Resolution of the Institute of International
Law, in 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 136 (1960); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE LAW, REPORT ON THE SELF-JUDGING ASPECT OF THE UNITED STATES' DOMESTIC JURISDIC-
TION RESERVATION WITH RESPECT TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1959), reprinted in
Hearings on S. Res. 94, supra note 100, at 28 1; COMMITTEE FOR EFFECTIVE USE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT BY REPEALING THE SELF-JUDGING RESERVATION, REPORT ON THE CONNALLY AMENDMENT: VIEWS
OF LAW SCHOOL DEANS, LAW SCHOOL PROFESSORS, INTERNATIONAL LAW PROFESSORS (1961); President
Eisenhower's State of the Union Message, Jan. 7, 1960, in 42 DEP'T ST. BULL. No. 1074, at 111, 118
(1960). But see Letter from Senator Tom Connally to Senator J.W. Fullbright (Feb. 16, 1960), in
Hearings on S. Res. 94, supra note 100, at 164 (repeal of the Connally reservation would be unwise).
138. See supra, text accompanying note 96.
139. See Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (U.S. v. Bulgaria), 1960 I.C.J. 146 (Order of May 30)
(Bulgaria invoked the reservation on the basis of reciprocity, and the United States requested a
discontinuance of the proceedings); Gross, Bulgaria Invokes the ConnallyAmendment, 56 AM. J. INT'L
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invoked the reservation to bar Nicaragua's suit in Paramilitary Activities, it
chose not to do so because it could not, in good faith, assert that mining
Nicaragua's harbors, participating in covert military incursions into Nic-
aragua, and backing rebels seeking to overthrow Nicaragua's government
were matters within its domestic jurisdiction. Unfortunately, other states
may not feel limited by, and are not required by the Court to observe, the
principle of good faith. 140 It would be purposeless for this Comment to add
further to the already exhaustive literature, save to argue that it would be
unwise to resurrect the automatic reservation in a new declaration.
An additional question remains as to whether an objective reservation of
domestic jurisdiction is called for. Under Article 36, paragraph 2 of the
Statute, the jurisdiction of the Court is limited to the four classes of
international legal disputes there enumerated. 14 1 Therefore, a state can
always interpose a plea of domestic jurisdiction as an objection to the
Court's jurisdiction or as a substantive defense. 142 The objective form of the
domestic jurisdiction reservation merely adds a belt to the suspenders of the
inherent jurisdictional limitations of the Statute. 143
4. The Vandenberg Multilateral Treaty Reservation
The Vandenberg reservation excludes "disputes arising under a multi-
lateral treaty, unless (1) all the Parties to the treaty affected by the decision
are also parties to the case before the Court, or (2) the United States of
America specially agrees to jurisdiction .... " 144 Virtually all the com-
mentators which discuss this reservation declare that its meaning, effect,
and purpose are unclear. 145 It has even been asserted that the reservation is
not consistent with the Statute. 146 Most speculation denotes a dim view of
L. 357 (1962).
Although the State Department claimed that the United States has "never been able to use our
acceptance to bring other states before the Court..., Statement on Termination, supra note 4, at 67,
Professor D'Amato points out that fear of the Connally reservation being invoked reciprocally
prevented the United States from bringing such actions. D'Amato, supra note 53. at 331-32.
140. See Waldock, supra note 32, at 277.
141. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
142. Waldock, The Plea of Domestic Jurisdiction Before International Legal Tribunals, 1954
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 96, 140.
143. See Waldock, supra note 32, at 113.
144. 1946 Declaration, supra note 2. Like the Connally Amendment, the multilateral treaty
reservation was introduced into the United States Declaration in the Senate.
145. "IT]he language of the reservation betrays such confusion of thought that to this day no one is
quite sure what it means." Briggs, supra note 36, at 307. See also. Briggs, supra note 107, at 378 ("a
reservation that by its terms is nonsensical"); D'Amato, supra note 5, at 394 ("The wording of the
reservation leaves much to be desired .... "); Merrills, supra note 26, at 107; Waldock, supra note
32, at 273. The legislative history of the reservation sheds little light on these questions. Id.
146. Briggs, supra note 107, at 378.
1166
Vol. 61:1145, 1986
Reaccepting Compulsory Jurisdiction
the reservation's purpose. It has been suggested that the reservation was
added partly as a precautionary measure because of unfamiliarity with the
Court's jurisprudence 147 and, more pragmatically, to preclude the Court
from prejudging the rights of states whose rights would be "affected"
within the meaning of the reservation, but are not parties to the proceed-
ings. 148 However, Article 59 of the Statute provides that only the parties to a
case are bound by the Court's decision, 149 and Article 63 creates a right of
intervention by third-party states where the construction of a multilateral
treaty is at issue. 150 Until recently, the apparent disutility of the Vandenberg
reservation has been a matter of speculation. However, the Court's inter-
pretation of the reservation in Paramilitary Activities leaves no doubt.
The United States argued that the reservation would bar jurisdiction as to
all of Nicaragua's claims because the complaint relied upon multilateral
treaties including the United Nations Charter, and that the alleged viola-
tions of customary international law were actually restatements of the
alleged treaty violations. 151 The United States identified Honduras, Costa
Rica, and El Salvador as parties to treaties that would be affected within the
meaning of the reservation. 152 The majority, while declining to challenge
the validity of the reservation, severely restricted its application. '3 In his
147. D'Amato, supra note 5, at 394.
148. Note, supra note 31, at 502. But cf. Kirgis, supra note 109, at 655 ("[I]t was intended to
protect the United States from decisions that would place it at a disadvantage relative to its similarly
situated multilateral treaty partners who could not be made parties to the proceedings.").
149. STATUTrE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OFJUSTICE, art. 59 ("The decision of the Court has no
binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.").
150. Id. at art. 63, paras. 1, 2. See also Paramilitary Activities, 1984 I.C.J. at 425 (States
"affected" within the meaning of the United States Declaration have the choice of either instituting
proceedings or intervening, in so far as their interests are not already protected by Article 59 of the
Statute).
151. Paramilitary Activities, 1984 I.C.J. at 423.
152. Id. at 422.
153. The Court held that: (1) the reservation does not bar all of Nicaragua's claims because the
asserted customary international law claims may continue to be separate violations even though also
incorporated into the treaties in some respects; (2) the rights of third parties are already protected
because separate proceedings may be initiated or a state may intervene under Articles 62 and 63 of the
Statute; (3) the decision as to what states are "affected" within the meaning of the reservation must be
made by the Court; and (4) since such a decision relates to the merits of the case, the Court is not barred
from going on to the merits. Id. at 424-26. In fact, El Salvador was not permitted to intervene under
Article 63 at the preliminary jurisdictional phase of the case, although it still had that option when the
case reached the merits. Id. at 425.
In his dissent, Judge Schwebel pointed out that since a preliminary objection can no longer be argued
at the merits phase because the procedure for joinder of a preliminary objection to the merits has been
eliminated, the reservation is inoperative at the stage in which it was intended to operate. Id. at 608
(Schwebel, J., dissenting). However, in its judgment on the merits, the Court applied the reservation,
and held that because El Salvador would be "affected" by the Court's decision, it could not entertain
claims arising under the OAS Charter and the UN Charter. International Court of Justice, Communique
No. 86/8, at 7-8 (27 June 1986) (unofficial report of Judgment of 27 June 1986 in the Case Concerning
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua).
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dissenting opinion, Judge Schwebel pointed out that the Court's judgment
effectively vitiates the reservation. 154 The decision not only incapacitates
the reservation procedurally, it also implies that it can be circumvented
substantively by alleging concurrent violations of customary international
law. Thus, even conceding the reservation's validity, it does not provide the
defensive protection for which it was originally intended, and seems to
address none of the administration's current objections. For these reasons,
the Vandenberg reservation need not be reconsidered for inclusion in a new
declaration. 155
5. Six-Month Notice for Termination
The self-imposed requirement of six-month notice for termination
sought, in 1946, to demonstrate the United States resolve never to attempt
to escape from the ICJ's jurisdiction in the face of an impending lawsuit. 156
That resolve was drawn into question by the United States preliminary
attempt to avoid participating in the Paramilitary Activities litigation. By
submitting the 1984 Notification, 157 the United States sought to escape the
strictures of the six-month notice provision by purporting to "modify" the
1946 Declaration. 158 The United States employed several arguments in
support of its position. First, declarations under the Optional Clause are
unique in the law of treaties, and modification may be made at any time up
until the moment an application is filed, and in any manner not inconsistent
with the Statute. ' 59 Second, other states asserting rights of immediate
termination created a fundamental change in circumstances subsequent to
the United States declaration, so that it would be inequitable to deny the
United States an opportunity to modify its declaration in view of that
change. 160 Third, if the 1984 Notification constituted a termination, rather
than a modification, the United States still could exercise the right to
immediate termination based on reciprocity arising from the Nicaraguan
declaration. 161 The ICJ rejected all of these arguments, holding that the six-
month notice requirement must be complied with regardless of whether the
154. Paramilitary Activities, 1984 I.C.J. at 604-05, (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
155. Professor D'Amato has reached the same conclusion. See D'Amato, supra note 53, at 333.
156. A resolve amply demonstrated by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations' report on the
1946 Declaration, which noted that the six-month requirement "has the effect of a renunciation of any
intention to withdraw our obligation in the face of a threatened legal proceeding." S. REP. No. 1835,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1946).
157. See supra note 104.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 104-05.
159. Paramilitary Activities, 1984 I.C.J. at 415.
160. Id. at 415-16.
161. Id. at 416-17.
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notification constitutes a termination or a modification, 162 and that the
United States could not ignore a condition imposed by its own declara-
tion. 163
The 1984 Notification and the supporting arguments demonstrate a basic
dissatisfaction with the limitations imposed by a lengthy notice require-
ment. For this reason, a far less restrictive notice provision would be
necessary to satisfy the administration's objections. The United States
deposited the 1984 Notification with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations three days prior to the filing of the Nicaraguan Application. Only a
condition providing for immediate termination or variation would have
rendered that modification effective. Consequently, it seems likely that
nothing less than just such a condition would be deemed acceptable in a
future declaration. 164
State practice suggests that immediately effective conditions are
valid,165 and as to modifications, the ICJ has expressly so held. 166 The dual
rights of termination and modification with immediate effect allow for
maximum defensive protection. 167 Additionally, as observed by the Court
in Paramilitary Activities, such conditions are not subject to the principle of
reciprocity, 168 so the declaration's offensive effectiveness would be unim-
paired. While criticism of these conditions must be acknowledged, 169 the
evolution of the Optional Clause system, as evidenced by state practice,
162. Id. at 421.
163. Id. at 419.
164. British practice has demonstrated the "tactical use of the power to terminate a declaration."
Merrills, supra note 26, at 103. By reserving a right of immediate termination, the British have
denounced a declaration and deposited a new one soon thereafter, incorporating new reservations
therein. In the case of a United States declaration, the necessity of the advice and consent of the Senate
renders such a regime impractical. However, incorporation of a right of immediate modification would
have virtually the same effect as the British practice.
165. "It is well established that states may make such reservations. "Gross, supra note 32, at
79. On the effect of state practice in determining validity of reservations, see Crawford, supra note 52,
at 75-83; see also supra text accompanying note 40.
166. Right of Passage, 1957 I.C.J. at 142-48.
167. States with declarations terminable on notice enjoy a tremendous tactical advantage over
other parties to the Optional Clause. However, the option of immediate denunciation tends to encourage
the premature filing of applications, and is "incompatible with a resolute commitment to the Court's
jurisdiction." Merrills, supra note 26, at 92.
168. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. One commentator's suggested reservation relies on
a reserved right of reciprocal termination. See D'Amato, supra note 53, at 336 ("[I]n relation to any
state with a shorter period between notice and modification or termination, that shorter period shall
apply as well to the United States."). However, it is unclear whether this proposal is compatible with the
Court's jurisprudence regarding pre-seisin reciprocity. See generally Comment, Nicaragua v. United
States: Pre-Seisin Reciprocity and the Race to the Hague, 46 Oto ST. L.J. 699 (1985). "[Rleciprocity
of temporal reservations prior to the seisin of the Court proves untenable." Id. at 708 (emphasis in
original). This should also hold true in the case of reservations that operate prior to seisin.
169. See supra text accompanying note 73; see also C.W. JNKms, supra note 5, at 108 (Such
reservations "appear to be inconsistent with the effectiveness of the [Optional] Clause.").
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suggests that these restrictions on the scope of compulsory jurisdiction may
be necessary evils, because states are unwilling to deposit declarations
without them. 170 There remains, however, the possibility that the Court will
intervene to lessen the harsh impact of the operation of these conditions.
Having determined that reasonable notice is an implied condition in decla-
rations with no termination provision, 171 the Court may, if confronted with
a declaration providing for immediate termination or modification, hold
that although such termination or modification takes effect as of the
moment of notification, the notification process itself must consume a
reasonable period of time. 172 Such a holding would reduce slightly the
defensive effectiveness of these conditions, but only in instances of the
most precipitate, and therefore the most objectionable, modifications.
B. Proposals
The following proposal for a new United States declaration of acceptance
of the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ (hereinafter referred to as Pro-
posed Declaration) contains reservations that, if adopted along the given or
similar lines, would better serve the national interest than the present state
of nonacceptance:
The United States of America accepts [as compulsory ipsofacto and without
special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same obliga-
tion] 173 the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, until
such time as notice may be given to terminate the acceptance, in all [legal]
diputes arising after 26 August 1946;
Provided, that
1. This declaration shall not apply to disputes
(a) where the acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction by another party to the
dispute was deposited or ratified less than twelve months prior to the filing of
the application bringing the dispute before the Court; or
(b) arising from measures taken by the United States of America related to or
connected with facts or situations involving armed conflicts, belligerency,
military occupation, the exercise of individual or collective self-defense, or
the discharge of any military or peacekeeping function in accordance with
170. See supra notes 72 & 76 and accompanying text.
17 1. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
172. D'Amato, supra note 5, at 391 n.17.
173. The bracketed portions of the proposal are not particularly important because a state is free to
choose any form that adequately expresses its intention to accept compulsory jurisdiction. See S.
ROSENNE, supra note 15, at 379-80.
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recommendations or decisions of international bodies or regional organiza-
tions; and
2. Any case brought by any party against the United States of America in
accordance with this declaration, shall, if requested by any party, be decided
by a Chamber of the International Court of Justice, composed in accordance
with Article 26, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, whose membership
includes all or some of the judges designated by both parties in accordance
with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, but no judge not so
designated; provided that any party failing, within six months, to express its
views regarding the composition of the Chamber in accordance with Article
17, paragraph 2 of the Rules of Court, as to, unless otherwise agreed by the
parties, at least ten members of the Court, shall be deemed to have consented
to the views expressed by the other parties to the case; and
3. The United States of America also reserves the right at any time, by means
of a notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
and with effect as from the moment of such notification, either to add to,
amend or withdraw any of the foregoing reservations and conditions, or any
that may hereafter be added; and
4. The reservations included herein are, unless amended or withdrawn in
accordance with the provisions of this declaration, deemed inseverable from,
and an essential basis of the consent to be bound by, this declaration.
1. Twelve-Month Exclusion
This reservation, modeled on a British exception, 174 is intended to
remedy the problem of "surprise applications";175 that is, where a state
which has not accepted compulsory jurisdiction initiates a suit by filing its
declaration under the Optional Clause immediately prior to filing its
application. If such a declaration includes a provision for immediate
termination, the state is virtually insulated from the filing of applications by
other states. 176 The twelve-month exclusion precludes such unscrupulous
174. See declaration of the United Kingdom, 1984-1985 I.C.J.Y.B. 98-99 (1985). This reservation
was introduced in the British declaration in 1957. It excludes:
disputes in respect of which any other Party to the dispute has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice only in relation to or for the purpose of the dispute; or where
the acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction on behalf of any other Party to the dispute
was deposited or ratified less than twelve months prior to the filing of the application bringing the
dispute before the Court.
Id. at 99.
175. Merrills, supra note 26, at 101-02.
176. Of course, a state is vulnerable to counterclaims in a suit instituted by surprise application.
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use of compulsory jurisdiction. It forces states who are contemplating
offensive litigation to file their declarations at least twelve months in
advance. Although eight states now include a similar reservation in their
declarations, 177 it has not been invoked before the Court. Nonetheless, its
validity seems assured, because it operates as a unilateral remedy to what
appears to be a glaring deficiency in the Optional Clause system. 178
Reciprocity, if invoked, operates as a bar to offensive litigation during the
year following the deposit of the declaration, but is not a factor thereafter.
The twelve-month exclusion, in conjunction with the right of immediate
variation, obviates the need for a specific reservation protecting against the
"single shot problem";179 that is, where states file limited declarations that
accept the Court's compulsory jurisdiction in contemplation of litigating a
specific dispute.180 The United States, when necessary, could rely on a
reserved right of modification to defeat such limited acceptances. 18' Were
such a declaration filed, the United States would, pursuant to a twelve-
month exclusion, have twelve months in which to modify its declaration in
response. The British declaration approaches the problem by reserving
"disputes in respect of which any other Party to the dispute has accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice only in rela-
tion to or for the purpose of the dispute.' 1 82 This vague language is
susceptible to adverse interpretation. The question of whether the jurisdic-
tion of the Court has been accepted "only in relation to or for the purpose of
the dispute" may not be readily determinable. Moreover, if a state's
purpose in depositing a declaration is challenged, the question of jurisdic-
tion may be relevant to the merits of the case, 183 in which instance the Court
will not be barred from going on to the merits, as amply demonstrated in
Paramilitary Activities. 184
177. See declarations of India, Israel, Malta, Mauritius, New Zealand, Philippines, Somalia. and
United Kingdom, 1984-1985 I.C.J.Y.B. 66-101 (1985).
178. See Merrills, supra note 26, at 102 (These reservations put parties "on an equal footing
179. D'Amato, supra note 5, at 388-89.
180. It has been questioned whether such declarations are sufficient to qualify as acceptances under
Article 36, paragraph 2. Merrills, supra note 26, at 102. But cf Declaration of Egypt, 1984-1985
I.C.J.Y.B. 73 (1985) (a declaration of acceptance limited to disputes arising under a paragraph of a
particular treaty).
18 1. See D'Amato, supra note 5, at 388-89. "[lf state B, 12 months before filing suit against the
United States accepts the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court only for questions regarding
Antarctica, the United States could modify its own Declaration . . .to take B's possible tactics into
account." Id. at 388.
182. Declaration of the United Kingdom, 1984-1985 I.C.J.Y.B. 98-99 (1985).
183. S. ROSENNE, THE TIME FACTOR IN THE JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
22-23 (1960).
184. See supra note 153.
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2. Armed Conflict Reservation
In the Paramilitary Activities case, the United States argued that inad-
missability of disputes involving armed hostilities is an implied limitation
on the Court's jurisdiction.185 This position was first used as ajustification
for the deposit of the 1984 Notification. Subsequently, one of the primary
public justifications given by the United States government for its refusal to
participate further in the case was that the questions presented were
inappropriate for judicial resolution. 186 The United States position is that
international law concerning aggression, self-defense, and intervention is
so highly controversial that submission to binding adjudication on such
matters is likely to infringe on national sovereignty and security. 187 Also, it
has been forcefully argued by jurists and commentators that the Court is
ineffective in adjudicating "force cases." 188 A reservation ratione materiae
excluding such disputes would remedy this objection.
Simple subject-matter reservations are unquestionably valid. At present,
eight states include some form of armed hostility reservation in their
declarations. 189 Procedurally, the armed conflict reservation is clearly
effective. Although these reservations are subject to the doctrine of re-
ciprocity, the United States should have no interest in bringing such actions
as plaintiff, since the United States claims that such disputes are non-
justiciable. 190
However, as a reservation ratione materiae, an armed conflict reserva-
tion is subject to several general criticisms. First, although subject-matter
reservations remove certain areas of international law from the competence
of the Court with respect to the reserving state, the development of general
customary international law will proceed irrespective of the reservation. 191
The effect of subject-matter reservations may be to disable the reserving
state from participating in cases that could determine the content of
customary law. 192 Second, since reservations ratione materiae create
185. The Court later rejected this argument by a unanimous vote. Paramilitary Activities, 1984
I.C.J. at 442.
186. Statement on Withdrawal, supra note 4, at 64. The United States asserted that the dispute "is
an inherently political problem that is not appropriate for judicial resolution" and that the ICJ is "not
suited" to decide such issues. Id.
187. Sofaer Statement, supra note 4, at 70-71. Cf. Powell, Judge Hardy Cross Dillard, 69 VA. L.
REv. 805, 808 (1983) ("[wlhere national interests conflict with international law, it is not surprising
that the former usually prevail.").
188. Note, supra note 10, at 190, passim.
189. See declarations of El Salvador, India, Israel, Kenya, Malawi, Malta, Mauritius, and Sudan,
1984-1985 I.C.J.Y.B. 66-101 (1985).
190. But see infra text accompanying note 198.
191. D'Amato, supra note 5, at 396-97.
192. Id. Since advancing this criticism, and those discussed infra at notes 193 and 194, Professor
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"holes" in the scope of the ICJ's substantive jurisdiction, they may conse-
quently be regarded as a serious erosion of the Court's jurisdiction. 193
As to reservations involving the use of armed force, the first criticism is
of minimal concern to the United States government. The United States has
consistently regarded such conflicts as political problems which are more
appropriately resolved by the U.N. Security Council or regional organiza-
tions. In Paramilitary Activities, the United States argued that Nicaragua's
claim alleging violations of customary international law was actually "a
classic case arising under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,"
involving a political question to be resolved by the Security Council. 194
Additionally, the United States government often asserts that the use of
armed force involving matters of high national security cannot be subordi-
nated to rules of international law. 195 By refusing to accede to adjudication
of such disputes, the United States should not be bound by the proposition
that the disputes are, under customary international law, justiciable. 196
Similarly, by persistently objecting, the United States should not be bound
by substantive changes in customary law.
As to the second criticism, carefully worded subject-matter reservations
comprise the least constrictive type of limitation on the scope of com-
pulsory jurisdiction, because the "holes" they create are specific. An
armed conflict reservation concededly carves out of the Optional Clause a
large exception in an area of international law of primary importance.
Nonetheless, as a sole subject-matter reservation in a declaration, it still
leaves a vast area where compulsory jurisdiction can effectively operate.
Furthermore, this criticism does not recognize the potential value of
subject-matter reservations. Rather than eroding the Court's jurisdiction,
they may be setting the stage for more general acceptance. States which
might be unwilling to submit an unqualified declaration in areas where the
views on law materially differ among states, might be willing to submit
D'Amato appears to have found the benefits of an armed conflict reservation to outweigh United States
nonparticipation in the Optional Clause. Reasoning that the United States has the right to employ such
an exception, D'Amato asserts that "a principled argument can be made for an armed hostilities
exception." D'Amato. supra note 53, at 334.
193. Merrills, supra note 26, at 108.
194. Robinson, Letter to the Editor in Chief 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 423, 423 (1985).
195. See Sofaer Statement, supra note 4, at 70-71. Cf Dean Acheson's statement that the law
"simply does not deal with such questions of ultimate power-power that comes close to the sources of
sovereignty." Acheson, Remarks by the Honorable Dean Acheson, 1963 PRoc. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 14.
196. A state's acceptance of a principle of customary international law will be presumed "unless it
can adduce evidence of its actual opposition to the practice in question." Waldock, General Course on
Public International Law, 2 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 50 (1962). See also Stein, The Approach of a
Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J.
457 (1985). But cf A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 98-102 (1971)
(protest does not play a significant role in the formulation of international custom).
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declarations initially for a limited range of disputes and, having done so,
might subsequently be willing to extend their acceptance to other types of
disputes. 197
Additional criticisms specifically address the armed force reservation.
First, such a reservation would preclude the United States from resorting to
the Court in cases arising out of state-supported acts of terrorism or
violence, as occurred in Tehran in 1979 and led to the United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran case. 198 Second, other disputes
that have begun peacefully may be escalated into armed hostilities so as to
bring the dispute under the United States reservation solely to avoid the
Court's jurisdiction. 199
The first criticism highlights a troublesome flaw in the reservation. This
reservation certainly could be invoked, on the basis of reciprocity, to defeat
jurisdiction in cases where the United States files claims seeking ICJ
adjudication over disputes arising out of terrorist acts, or other unconven-
tional uses of force short of all-out war. One possible solution is to add a
proviso excluding just such acts of terrorism from the reservation's
coverage. 200 Such a solution, however, presents more problems than it
solves. "Terrorism" is a vague concept, and even attempts at more precise
definition 201 leave decisions on the application of the reservation to the
Court, an uncertain proposition at best. The invocation of the proviso, on
the basis of reciprocity, could vitiate the purpose of the reservation itself.
For example, in Paramilitary Activities, an armed hostility reservation
would have prevented jurisdiction. However, a terrorism proviso, if in-
voked by Nicaragua and interpreted broadly by the Court, could have been
applied to the alleged illegal acts of the United States, thereby defeating the
reservation's purpose. In such a highly sensitive area, it would be wiser to
err on the side of overinclusion and preclude some offensive litigation than
to weaken the defensive effectiveness of the reservation.
197. Fitzmaurice, supra note 32, at 473. See also Sohn, Step-By-Step Acceptance of the Jurisdic-
tion of the International Court of Justice, 1964 PRoc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 131. Recent declarations of
the United Kingdom and Australia manifest an increased commitment in comparison to the declarations
they replace. Merrills, supra note 26, at 116.
198. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment
of May 24). See D'Amato, supra note 5, at 397.
199. D'Amato, supra note 5, at 397.
200. For example: "[P]rovided, however, that this reservation shall not be deemed to cover actions
not justified by military necessity against ships and aircraft, diplomatic and governmental agents and
government property, or private citizens and their property .. "Gardner, U.S. Termination of the
Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 421,
426-27 (1986).
201. For a discussion of the difficulty of defining terrorism, see Note, An Analysis of the Achille
Lauro Affair: Towards an Effective and Legal Method ofBringing International Terrorists to Justice, 9
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 328, 349-56 (1986).
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The second criticism is based on the wholly unrealistic assumption that a
state would resort to violence in order to avoid a trial on the merits. This
seems highly unlikely. Rather, a state will not appear as respondent; or if a
decision is unacceptable to that state, the decision will be ignored. Given
the limited enforcement powers of the Court and the dormant enforcement
powers of the Security Council, 202 it is inconceivable that any state would
risk war with the United States in order to avoid an adverse ICJ decision. 20 3
3. Chambers Reservation204
The statements accompanying both the United States notice of with-
drawal from the Paramilitary Activities case, and the notice of termination
of the 1946 Declaration, suggest that the administration's decision was
based on the conclusion that the Court's handling of the Paramilitary
Activities case indicated blatant bias, such that the possibility of a fair
decision in that, or any other case, was unlikely. The notice of withdrawal
stated that:
[O]f the 16judges now claiming to sit in judgment on the United States in this
case, 11 are from countries that do not accept the Court's compulsory
jurisdiction. . . .The haste with which the Court proceeded to judgment
• . .adds to the impression that the Court is determined to find in favor of
Nicaragua in this case. . . .We will not risk US national security by
presenting . . . sensitive material . . . before a Court that includes judges
from Warsaw Pact nations. . . .We have seen . . . how international
202. See supra note 15.
203. A broader subject-matter reservation, excluding "political disputes" from the scope of
compulsory jurisdiction would also serve to eliminate disputes involving armed hostilities. Such a
reservation is far less desirable. On its face, the proposal is so vague it is difficult to give it any concrete
effect because vague reservations tend to be interpreted so narrowly. There are few, if any, international
disputes that do not have some political dimension. See Malloy, supra note 102, at 87 ("What dispute
between states reaching this court is not frought with political implications?"). There is nothing in the
Statute of the Court or in the United Nations Charter that prevents the Court from deciding such cases
provided it confines itself to deciding the legal issues. Indeed, Article 36, paragraph 3 of the Charter,
which specifically deals with disputes that endanger international peace and security, provides that
"legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice
. .. U N. CHARTER art. 36, para. 3. Cf. Statement on Withdrawal, supra note 4, at 64 ("The ICJ
• . .is patently unsuited for such a role."). In Paramilitary Activities, the Court demonstrated its
willingness to deal with the legal aspects of a case inextricably involved in a political dispute. See,
D'Amato, Nicaragua and International Law: The "Academic" and the "Real," 79 AM. J. INT'LL. 657,
658 (1985). It seems likely that the Court would interpret a "political dispute" reservation accordingly.
See generally Sohn, Exclusion of Political Disputes from Judicial Settlement, 38 AM. J. INTL L. 694
(1944).
204. The author is indebted to Richard N. Gardner, Henry L. Moses Professor of Law and
International Organization at Columbia University, for suggesting the possibility of this reservation.
Professor Gardner first proposed the reservation, in somewhat different form, before the United States
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, on December 4, 1985. See Gardner, supra note 200, at 427
(adapted from Professor Gardner's testimony before the Committee).
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organizations have become more and more politicized against the interests of
the Western democracies. 20 5
These statements are all apparently directed at highlighting a supposed
"politicization" of the Court. 206 Assuming arguendo that there is a degree
of truth in these allegations, 2 7 an effective reservation, from the admin-
istration's point of view, would minimize or eliminate this element of
politicization. The Chambers reservation is one possible solution.
The source of the power to set up a special Chamber for adjudication of a
particular legal dispute is found in Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Statute of
the Court.208 In order to "facilitate recourse to Chambers of the Court and
concede to the parties some influence in the composition of ad hoc
Chambers constituted under Article 26, paragraph 2, of the Statute, 209 the
Court twice revised the Chambers procedure.210 Article 17 now allows the
Court to ascertain the parties' desires for the composition of a Chamber.211
Article 18 provides for the full Court to elect, by secret ballot, the members
205. Statement on Withdrawal, supra note 4. In the Statement on Termination and the Sofaer
Statement, supra note 4, the reasons advanced by the administration for its secession from the Optional
Clause system are essentially the same. See, e.g., Statement on Withdrawal, supra note 4, at 67 ("[W]e
believed that. . . the Court's own appreciation of the need to adhere scrupulously to its proper judicial
role would prevent the Court's process from being abused for political ends. Those assumptions have
now been proved wrong."); Sofaer Statement, supra note 4, at 69 ("One reasonably may expect at least
some judges to be sensitive to the impact of their decisions on their standing with the UN majority.").
206. It has been suggested that the statements are in accord with the administration's alleged
"effort to disparage the judicial character and integrity of the Court." Chayes, supra note 109, at 1447.
207. The composition and membership of the Court has been criticized by commentators as well.
See J. GAMBLE & D. FIscHER, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: AN ANALYSIS OF A FAILURE 126
(1976) ("[Ihe reputation of the Court is totally inconsistent with reality."); Dalfen, The World Court in
Idle Splendour: The Basis of State's Attitudes, 23 INT'L J. 124, 135-36 (1967) (States will remain
reluctant to submit their disputes to binding adjudication as long as they perceive a lack of impartiality
and independence on the part of judges. The differences in the judges' legal and cultural backgrounds
might subtly and inappropriately influence their decisions.). But see Chayes, supra note 93, at 1448
("[I]f what is implied by 'political' is that the judges of th6 International Court of Justice vote their
preferences in the manner of senators or that they are instructed by their governments as are delegates to
the United Nations, that is simply not the case."). For a subtle analysis of this concern, see generally L.
PRorr, THE LATENT POWER OF CULITURE AND THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE (1979).
208. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 26, para. 2 ("The Court may at any
time form a chamber for dealing with a particular case. The number of judges to constitute such a
chamber shall be determined by the Court with the approval of the parties.").
209. Jimdnez de Ar6chaga, The Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the International Court
of Justice, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (1973).
210. See article 26 in the 1972 Rules of Court, 1972 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. No. 2, at 93, reprinted in
67 AM. J. INT'L L. 195, 203 (1973), also reprinted in S. ROSENNE, DOCUMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL
CoURTr OF JUSTICE 93-203 (2d ed. 1979). In 1978, the Court again published a set of revised rules. See
Rules of Court, supra note 18.
211. Rules of Court, supra note 18, art. 17, para. 2. Article 17 in pertinent part provides that "the
President shall ascertain [the parties'] views regarding the composition of the Chamber, and shall report
to the Court accordingly. He shall also take such steps as may be necessary to give effect to the
provisions of Article 31, paragraph 4, of the Statute."
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of any Chamber. 212 This procedure remained unused until the United States
and Canada invoked it in the Boundary Settlement Treaty of March 19,
1979.213
A clear objective of the Boundary Settlement Treaty was to permit the
parties to maintain a virtually absolute veto power over the composition of
the Chamber. 214 An escape mechanism eliminated the risk of the Court
electing a Chamber that did not meet the parties' preferences. 215 The Court
did, in fact, accede to the requests of the parties.216 However, two vigorous
dissents disagreed with the extent of the influence which the majority
permitted the parties to have over the Chamber's composition. 217 The
dissenters particularly criticized the escape mechanism, arguing that it
incorrectly permits the parties to "dictate to the Court who should be
elected" 218 and deprives the Court "of its basic and essential characteristic
212. Id. art. 18, para. I.
213. Treaty to Submit to Binding Dispute Settlement the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in
the Gulf of Maine Area, with Agreements, March 29, 1979, United States-Canada, T.I.A.S. No.
10204, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 1378-82 (1981) [hereinafter Boundary Settlement Treaty]. Prior to the
revisions of the Court's rules, no parties to a case before the Permanent Court or the ICJ had ever, in
their 50-year history, resorted to a Chamber of the Court formed for a particular case. Schwebel, New
Life for World Court, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 375, 377 (1983).
214. Note, Adjudication of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, 17 CAN. Y.B. INT'L
L. 292, 295 (1979). Article I of the Treaty sets forth the parties' agreement to submit the dispute to a
Chamber of the ICJ according to the provisions of the Special Agreement to Submit to a Chamber of the
International Court of Justice the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area
(Special Agreement), annexed to the Boundary Settlement Treaty. Boundary Settlement Treaty, supra
note 213, 20 I.L.M. at 1378. Article II stipulates that if the Special Agreement provisions are not carried
out within six months of the entry into force of the Treaty, either party may terminate the Special
Agreement, thereby automatically activating an Arbitration Agreement. Id. Article III of the Treaty
specifies that, in addition, either party may terminate the Special Agreement if a vacancy on the
Chamber is not filled to its satisfaction. Id. at 1379. The Special Agreement details the procedure for
submitting the dispute to a Chamber, including the requirement that the composition of the Chamber
shall consist of three Members of the ICJ and two ad hoc judges chosen by the parties. Special
Agreement, supra at 1389
215. Note, International Conflict Resolution: The ICJ Chambers and the Gulf of Maine Dispute,
23 VA. J. INT'L L. 463,483 (1983). Although Article I provides that the Court will select three judges, a
party dissatisfied with the Court's selection can choose to allow the six-month termination period of
Article II to elapse before notifying the Court of its choice for ad hoc judge. The Special agreement
would then no longer be operative, and the Court would not obtain jurisdiction over the case, in which
instance the Arbitration Agreement would be triggered.
216. See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1982
1.C.J. I (Order of Jan. 20). This is in accord with the predictions of commentators, who point out that
"from a practical point of view, it is difficult to conceive that in normal circumstances those Members
who have been suggested by the parties would not be elected." de Arechaga, supra note 209, at 3. If the
Court were to ignore the parties' wishes "the whole purpose of the procedure would fail." Hambro,
supra note 35, at 369.
217. Gulf of Maine, 1982 I.C.J. at 11, 12-13 (dissenting opinions of Morozov & EI-Khani, JJ.).
218. Id. at 11 (Morozov, J., dissenting).
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of universality .... ",219 Although outvoted eleven to tWo, 2 2 0 should the
dissenters' views find wider acceptance within the Court, the flexibility
intended by the revised Rules could be rendered nugatory.
The proposed Chambers reservation is intended to apply the procedure
of the Boundary Settlement Treaty in the context of the Optional Clause
system. By allowing the parties to express a preference forparticularjudges,
the Chambers procedure reduces the fear that a case will be heard by partial
judges. 221 However, the reservation is not conditioned on the parties'
acceptance of the Chamber's composition. 222 In the context of compulsory
jurisdiction, such an escape clause would, through the principle of re-
ciprocity, allow any party to divest the Court of jurisdiction over the case.
Rather, the reservation is conditioned on the selections of both parties. A
Chamber composed under the procedure contemplated in the reservation is
composed of mutually-selected judges, in addition to judges ad hoc se-
lected in accordance with Article 31.223 Thus, no Chamber that includes a
judge unacceptable to any party, with the possible exception of a judge ad
hoc, can conferjurisdiction over the case. While the Court retains power to
elect the members of the Chamber pursuant to Article 18 of the Rules, it
must do so in accordance with the common will of the parties, 224 or
jurisdiction will fail.
The proviso, specifying that each party must select at least ten acceptable
judges, precludes a state's attempt to avoid jurisdiction by failing to submit
its preference. A state failing to designate its preferences within six months
of the submission of an application effectively waives its right to choose.
By requiring that each party select at least ten acceptable judges, the
reservation avoids the possibility of one party selecting a small number of
choices that are clearly unacceptable to another party. Because the full
Court consists of fifteen judges, the minimum intersection of two parties'
219. Id. at 12 (EI-Khani, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 8.
221. Note, supra note 215, at 479.
222. But cf. Gardner, supra note 200, at 425 ("We could condition our acceptance of compulsory
jurisdiction on a U.S. right to have any case to which we are a party decided by a chamber of the Court
composed of judges acceptable to ourselves.").
223. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JusTICE, art. 31, para. 4. In pertinent part,
paragraph 4 provides that "[t]he President shall request one or, if necessary, two of the members of the
Court forming the Chamber to give place to the members of the Court of the nationality of the parties
concerned .... "This procedure is incorporated by reference in Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Rules
of Court, supra note 18.
224. The Court does maintain complete discretion within the limits of the intersection of the
parties' selections.
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choices is a three-judge bench. 225 Although the parties are accorded ef-
fective veto power over only five judges, the possibility of jurisdictional
nullification by lack of consensus is eliminated. Finally, the reservation
preserves a right for parties, by agreement, to select fewer than ten
acceptable judges.
A number of criticisms can be directed at the validity of the Chambers
reservation. First, it is facially invalid as a reservation purporting to affect
the "functioning and organization" of the Court. Second, it does not satisfy
the requirement of "reciprocity of obligation." Finally, it is incompatible
with the object and purpose of the Statute because it improperly attempts to
integrate extrinsic procedures into the Optional Clause system.
The facial invalidity argument was raised in dictum by Judge Lauter-
pacht in his separate opinion in Norwegian Loans, where he observed that
"while the Statute as interpreted in practice permits reservations to its
jurisdiction it does not permit reservations as to the functioning and the
organization of the Court. ", 226 Although his reasoning appears to apply to
the Chambers reservation, it seems unlikely that Judge Lauterpacht had in
mind a reservation that specifically invokes procedures provided for in the
Statute itself.227 It is true, however, that the proviso to the reservation
attempts to prescribe additional obligations with respect to the Chambers
procedure as applied by the reservation. Consequently, the Lauterpacht
view, which has never been endorsed by the Court, may be more readily
applicable. Even so, while the proviso makes the reservation far more
effective, the reservation could operate without it.228 The effect of this
limited version would be to allow either party unilaterally to divest the
Court of jurisdiction by witholding its judicial selections. This would be
similar in practice to, and subject to the same criticisms as, the automatic
divestiture effect of the Connally Amendment: maximum defensive protec-
tion at the cost of a dramatically reduced offensive effectiveness.
225. This is necessary because under Article 31 of the Statute, if a Chamber includes no judge of
the nationality of the parties, each of the parties may choose ajudge to whom the members of the Court
forming the Chamber are requested to give their place on the Chamber. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 31, paras. 2-4.
226. Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9, 45 (Lauterpacht, J., dissenting).
227. The Chambers procedure not only is provided for in the Statute, it has also received the
imprimatur of the Court. See supra text accompanying note 210. A reservation that attempted, for
example, to change the location of the Court's seat would more clearly violate Judge Lauterpacht's
principle. A reservation that explicitly attempted in a given case to limit the bench to judges from states
who have made declarations under the Optional Clause would be equally problematic, although the
same effect could be achieved under the arguably nonviolative chambers reservation.
228. But see paragraph 4 of the Proposed Declaration, which nullifies the declaration in case a
reservation is declared invalid. An additional term could be appended to the reservation, providing that
if the proviso is declared invalid, the declaration is to be automatically amended to operate without it,
notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 4 of the Proposed Declaration. See D'Amato, supra note
53, at 335 (introducing an example of a self-amending reservation).
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The principle of obligation, embodied in the phrase "ipso facto and
without special agreement"2 29 purportedly mandates that the terms on
which a state recognizes compulsory jurisdiction are nonnegotiable. This
means that an instrument that appears to recognize compulsory jurisdic-
tion, but which in fact requires elements of negotiation as part of it, entails
no legal obligation and is not a true recognition of compulsory jurisdiction
under Article 36, paragraph 2.230 It could be argued that the Chambers
reservation requires a crude form of negotiation in the selection of judges.
However, negotiation on a collateral procedural point hardly violates the
spirit of this principle. The parties are still bound to litigate the dispute.
They are not at liberty to determine the extent or existence of their
obligation to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court, which is the prohibi-
tion embodied in the principle of obligation.3 1 Moreover, this argument
may not be as damaging as it seems, because it is recognized that a
declaration which is invalid as an Article 36, paragraph 2 jurisdictional
predicate can, in a concrete case, confer jurisdiction on the basis of Article
36, paragraph 1.232 Lastly, the Court has never invalidated a declaration on
the basis of lack of obligation.233
Object and purpose validity234 presents a more difficult problem. Histor-
ically, every reservation under the Optional Clause has operated to limit the
scope of the Court's jurisdiction to entertain a particular dispute. The
Chambers reservation, however, seeks to impose positive obligations on
potentially unwilling parties after the court is seised of the dispute, by
engrafting the consensual Chambers procedure onto the mandatory Op-
tional Clause system. In this way, the reservation can operate to divest a
party of the protection of the full fifteen-member Court; a protection that
may well have been at least an implicit condition of that party's consent to
compulsory jurisdiction. 235 In form and operational effect, this reservation
is sui generis; foreign to the Statute and unsupported in state practice.
229. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL Couizr OF JUSTICE, art. 36, para. 2.
230. See S. ROSENNE, supra note 15, at 370-71; Crawford, supra note 52, at 83.
231. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
232. See S. ROSENNE, supra note 15, at 371; Crawford, supra note 52, at 83-85. In Norwegian
Loans, Judge Lauterpacht argued that invalid declarations can confer jurisdiction on the basis offorum
prorogatum. Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9, 60 (separate opinion of Lauter-
pacht, J.). See supra note 25. Thus, in a given case, the states could agree.to litigate the dispute even
after the reservation was found to be incompatible and the declaration declared invalid. Subsequently,
the United States could modify its declaration.
233. For that matter, the Court has never invalidated a reservation on any basis. See supra note 62
and accompanying text.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 50-62.
235. Cf. Hyde, A Special Chamber of the International Court of Justice-An Alternative to AdHoc
Arbitration, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 439, 440 (1968) ("[G]ovemments parties do not want to 'buy a pig in a
poke,' and would rather have the entire bench than a chamber, which is elected by the Court by secret
ballot and by an absolute majority of votes .... ").
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Nonetheless, object and purpose validity is little more than the ICJ's
interpretation of the Statute as applied to a particular reservation. The
Court is well aware of the sparsity of contentious cases and its declining
jurisdictional base.236 In fact, the Chambers procedure itself has been twice
liberalized, ostensibly to "give [the Court] new life." 237 Pragmatically, it
seems unlikely, in light of past unwillingness to invalidate reservations and
present day international reality, that the Court would refuse to extend the
utilitarian effects of Chambers to the realm of the Optional Clause.
The Chambers reservation is a fragile exception. A majority of re-
calcitrant judges could easily neutralize its intended effect, and a change in
the Rules of Court might render the reservation useless. The composition of
a particular Chamber could reduce the precedential impact of its deci-
sion. 238 Beyond this, tactical use of Chambers in an attempt to regionalize
or "westernize" the ICJ's composition may call into question the integrity
of the Court.239 However, rather than indicating ineffectiveness or imprac-
ticability of the reservation itself, these criticisms call for restraint in its
invocation.
4. The Condition of Inseverability
This condition merely serves to predetermine for purposes of the Pro-
posed Declaration the question of whether invalid reservations nullify the
whole declaration. Scholars have debated the question inconclusively, 240
and the Court, with the exception of Judge Lauterpacht, 241 has not ad-
dressed the issue. The reason for the condition is to protect the United
States from jurisdiction in cases where it has relied on another reservation
or condition which is subsequently declared invalid. 242
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States termination of its acceptance of compulsory jurisdic-
tion is a step backward in the course of international law. Even those who
236. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
237. Schewebel, supra note 213, at 377. See also Jim6nez de Ardchaga, supra note 209, at 2.
238. Robinson, Colson & Rashkow, Some Perspectives on Adjudicating Before the World Court:
The Gulf of Maine Case, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 579, 583 (1985).
239. See Gulf of Maine, 1982 I.C.J. at 12 (EI-Khani, J., dissenting); McWhinney, Special
Chambers Within the International Cout of Justice: The Preliminary Procedural Aspect of the Gulf of
Maine Case, 12 SYR. J. INT'L L. & Co, . L. 1, 7-13 (1985).
240. See, e.g., S. ROSENNE, supra note 15, at 397; Briggs, supra note 36, at 360- 61; Crawford,
supra note 52, at 68; Preuss, Questions Resulting From the Connally Amendment, 32 A.B.A. J. 660,
720 (1946); Waldock, supra note 142, at 132-36.
241. See supra text accompanying note 59.
242. Cf D'Amato, supra note 53, at 335 (automatically self-amending provisos might be appended
to reservations themselves).
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maintain that the termination was obliged by the national interest must
acknowledge that the United States national interest is not necessarily
coextensive with that of the organized international community or with
advancement of the rule of international law. In this case it certainly was
not. If the United States wishes to impose rules of international law upon
other states, it must recognize its own accountability. If the United States
wishes to be recognized for its leadership in promoting international
morality through the advancement of international law, its actions must
support the claim. Termination of the 1946 Declaration may be perceived,
on a practical level, as a small sacrifice. It is, however, a sacrifice that so
fragile an institution as the international rule of law should not be required
to bear. The laudable ideals recognized in 1946 ought not to give way to
transient political concerns. This action brings the United States, in its
relationship to the ICJ, one step closer to that of nations such as the People's
Republic of China and the Soviet Union, who have never accepted com-
pulsory jurisdiction, 243 and whose commitment to universal principles of
international law and international legal accountability leaves a great deal
to be desired.
The proposed reservations attempt to strike a balance between these high
ideals and the reality of an international community that is largely unwill-
ing to accept the Optional Clause. They stem from the belief that the
advantages of the system of ICJ compulsory jurisdiction outweigh its
burdens. Moreover, they attempt to minimize the perceived burdens upon
the United States by protecting particular national interests of the United
States. The procedural minutiae upon which this Comment is predicated
may seem incongruous to the lofty ideals underlying them. There is no
doubt that unqualified acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction most fully
achieves the moral and psychological advantages with which acceptance is
associated. However, it may well be that the partial cession of sovereignty
which compulsory jurisdiction requires must proceed, if at all, one step at a
time. The proposals in this Comment are intended only as a non-exhaustive
framework for partially retracing those steps. It is to be hoped that a limited
recognition of the substantial benefits of compulsory jurisdiction inexora-
bly will lead to unqualified willingness to stand accountable before the
international community for any and all actions;under the rule of interna-
tional law.
Douglas J. Ende
243. Governments of the Third World have been equally lax in their utilization of the Optional
Clause. See W. WILLIAMS, AmTrluDEs OF THE LESSER DEVELOPED CouNTRIs TOWARD THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COURT OF JUSTnCE 21-29 (1976).
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